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L INTRODUCTION
It has been a while since license plates were a constitutional topic.
Twenty-odd years ago it was New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" plate
that was in the spotlight.1 The Maynards, Jehovah's Witnesses who
disagreed with the motto's message, successfully argued that the state
violated their free speech rights when it required them to display the motto
on their cars.2 According to the Supreme Court, "[t]he First Amendment
protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the
majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they find morally
objectionable."3 Although established in the context of a four-word motto
that was inches tall at best, this free speech precedent has grown and
branched far beyond this limited type of expression.4
Now, license plates have again become the source of a free speech
controversy. The constitutional angle, however, has shifted. The argument
is no longer that a state forces individuals to use their private property as
1. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,707 (1977) (New Hampshire required that noncommercial vehicles bear license plates embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or Die," and
made it a misdemeanor to "knowingly obscure... the figures or letters on any number plate.")
(quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 263:1,262:27-c (Supp. 1975)).

2. Id.
at 707,717.
3. Id. at 715.
4. The constitutional principles thatcondemn govemment efforts to compel expression stem

from the early cases of West Virginia State BL of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(invalidating pledge of allegiance and flag salute requirements) and Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. The
contexts in which this doctrine applies nowinclude mediacompelled access requirements, e-g., Pac.
Gas &Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,4 (1986), compelled participation in parades,
e.g., Hurley v. Irish.AmericanGay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995),

compelled contributions to unions, e.g.,Abood v.DetroitBd.ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209,211 (1977),
and compelled contributions to marketing associations, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &Elliott,

Inc., 521 U.S. 457,460 (1997).
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"mobile billboard[s]" 5 for messages with which they disagree. Rather, the
focus is on state "specialty license plate" programs that allow individual
drivers to choose to buy a plate that advertises a particular organization's
name, logo, or motto.6 The current constitutional issue is whether the First
Amendment permits,7 or in fact requires,' a state to provide its citizens

with this option.
Two plates, available in several states, raise both sides of the current
controversy. The "Choose Life" plate, authorized by state legislatures to
be produced and distributed in both Florida9 and Louisiana, 1 presents one
side of the controversy. While both states offer a range of other license
plate choices," pro-choice groups sued, arguing that, with the "Choose
Life" plate, the government unconstitutionally aligned itself with a
controversial political message." A federal district court in Florida rejected

5. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
6. Under specialty license plate programs, groups or organizations can apply, pursuant to
established procedures, forlicense plates that feature some orall ofthefollowing: the group's name
or initials, its logo, or its motto. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954
F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (D. Md. 1997) (explaining that specialty plates "may take the form of either
a 'non-logo' plate, bearing a special tag number and the name, initials, or abbreviation of the name
of the organization; or a 'logo' plate, bearing a special tag number, the name, initials, or
abbreviation of the name of the organization, and an emblem or logo that symbolizes the
organization") (citing MD. CODE ANN., Transp. 11 § 13-619(g)(1)(i-ii) (1992 & Supp. 1996)).
7. See Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589,595-600 (E.D. La. 2000) (finding that
the Constitution does not permit states to issue "Choose Life" specialty plate).
8. See Glendening,954 F.Supp. at 1105 (findingthat theConstitution does notpermit states
to refuse to issue specialty plates with confederate flag logos).
9. The Florida "Choose Life" plates bear the motto along with a crayon drawing of two
smiling children. The proceeds from the plates are split between the state and organizations that
counsel women to choose adoption and provide for their material needs when they do. The Florida
legislature initially authorized theplates' issuancein 1998,butthen-govemorLawtonChilesvetoed
the measure. The legislature authorized the issuance again in 1999, afterJebBush became governor.
He signed the bill into law. Cristin Kellogg, Pro.life FloridiansFightfor Right to DriveHome a
Point; NOW Stalls "Choose Life" Plates,WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 2000, at A2. Several lawsuits
followed. Pursuant to one of them, a state court judgissued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
issuance of the plates. After an appellate court ruled that the case should be moved to a different
jurisdiction, the state began to issue the plates. John Pacenti & Antigone Barton, FloridaSelling
Tags Despite Court Tangle, PALM BEACHPOST, Aug. 12,2000, at IA.
10. Louisiana's "Choose Life" plate bears the motto along with a stork with a baby in a sling
hanging from its beak. The legislature authorized issuance of the plate by statute. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61 (West 2000). Pursuant to a constitutional challenge, a federal district court
issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting production of the plates. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d
at 602.
11. At the time of the lawsuit challenging the denial of the confederate flag logo plate,
Maryland issued specialty plates to 236 organizations. Some "FreeState," STUART NEWS, Mar. 12,
1997, at A8 [hereinafter Some "FreeState"]. At the time of its lawsuit, Florida had 51 specialty
plates. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2.
12. See Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at
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the argument, 3 while a federal district court in Louisiana accepted it as the
basis for granting a preliminary injunction forbidding the plates'

distribution. 4 According to the Louisiana court, the Constitution forbids

state legislatures from making the "Choose Life" plates available to their
citizens because they want to promote the pro-life message."5

The Confederate flag logo specialty plate sought by the Sons of
Confederate Veterans (SCV) in several states represents the other side of
the controversy.' 6 While some states offer drivers the option of purchasing
the specialty plates,' 7 others have recalled" or refused to authorize 9 plates
with the flag logo because it is perceived by other citizens as offensive.'
A federal district court in Maryland invalidated the Motor Vehicle
Administration's recall of the flag logo plates, holding that the state could
not constitutionally "[advance] the viewpoint of those offended by the flag
and [discourage] the viewpoint of those proud of it."' Another federal
court invalidated the Virginia legislature's refusal to authorize the flag
logo plate, accepting the plaintiffs' claim that the Constitution requires

*2-3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999); Henderson, 112 F. Supp. at 591.
13. Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *21 (dismissing case as not ripe, but
suggesting that the substantive arguments were meritless).
14. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
15. Id. at 598 (asserting that the state may "appropriate [Ifunds to promote adoption and
discourage abortion" but "once [it] creates a forum where viewpoints are expressed, it must be
viewpoint neutral").
16. The Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) has sought Confederate flag tags in Alabama,
North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia. See infra notes 129201 and accompanying text.
17. Confederate flag plates for the group are available in Alabama, North Carolina, Georgia,
Tennessee and Maryland. Sons of Confederate Veterans Get South CarolinaBattle Flag Tags,
CHATTANOOGA MEs, Dec. 20, 1999, at B2 [hereinafter SCV South Carolina].
18. A federal district court invalidated Maryland's attempt to recall the plates. Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Md. 1997).
19. See Rex Bowman, Suit Seeks Rebel Flag License Plate: FreeSpeech Issue Is Cited in
Case Filedin FederalCourt,RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 24, 1999, at B5.
20. See, e.g., Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1100 (stating that Maryland plates were recalled
because of "apparent negative racial connotations of the logo design displayed on the plate");
Bowman, supra note 19, at B5 ("[Filagless SCV license plate came about after black lawmakers
in the house of Delegates reminded colleagues that the Rebel flag, popular among hate groups,
offends many blacks who see it as a symbol of past racial hatred.); John Commins, McAfee Plans
Racefor 13th House Tenm, CHAIrANGA TIMFS, Jan. 17,2000, at B2 ("[B]ill to honor Sons of
Confederate Veterans with specialty license plates was stalled in House Calendar Committee.
Members of the General Assembly's Black Caucus complained that the plates featured a logo
displaying the Confederate flag.').
21. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1104-05.
22. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, No. 7:99CV005301, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 538 (W.D. Va. Jan. 18,2001).
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the state to make the flag logo plate available to those drivers who want to
publicize its message.'
Like the earlier New Hampshire license plate case,24 the current license
plate controversy is ostensibly cabined by its context-a complex political
diatribe simply cannot fit on the limited space devoted to "speech" on any
specialty license plate. Again, however, the free speech implications
extend beyond the confines of the license plate context. At issue more
generally is a government's authority to be selective when it subsidizes
private speakers. This is an issue unresolved by the Supreme Court, which
has in some cases validated the government's authority to be selective s
and in others limited it,' without thoroughly explaining the constitutional
principles that guide its judgmentsY The license plate controversy thus
provides an opportunity to develop these principles in a limited context,
from which resolution of the government's authority to pick and choose
among private speakers in a variety of other contexts can grow.
Part I describes the current specialty license plate controversy. It
describes the legislative approval process used in most states, and more
specifically details the legal challenges to states' issuance of "Choose ife"
plates and refusal to issue plates with the Confederate flag. Part HI sets out
the constitutional background against which the specialty plate
controversies take place, noting that government officials both among and
within states differ as to whether, according to the existing categories in
constitutional doctrine, their programs constitute a type of "government
speech" or rather constitute private speech "forums." Part IMI examines the
structure of the current specialty plate programs in light of free speech
values and the restrictions on the government's ability to be "selective"
among private speakers. Part I[[ demonstrates that specialty plate programs
are private speech forums rather than nonforum government/private speech
interactions, for which a greater degree of governmental discretion to be
selective is allowed. As private speech forums, Part IR argues that most of
the current specialty plate programs violate the Constitution. Specifically,
the range of legislative discretion to enact or reject legislation is
fundamentally inconsistent with the limits on discretion that apply to an
administrator of a speech forum. Part IV explains how states can structure
and administer a constitutional specialty plate program by moving it away

23. Id.; Bowman, supra note 19, at B5 C'Mhe state can't bar speech solely because it's

unpopular or offensive.'.
24. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,587-88 (1998) (finding
selectivity permissible in context of arts funding).
26. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,844-45 (1995)
(finding selectivity impermissible in context of student publication funding).
27. See id.; see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 583-84.
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from the legislature to an entity that can apply clear, non-discriminatory
access standards in a consistent way that can be subjected to meaningful
judicial review.
IL THE SPECLALTY PLATE CONTROVERSY
A. The Specialty License PlateApproval Process
Specialty license plates acknowledge a group or cause on the portion
of the plate not devoted to the letter/number identifying configuration.2"
Drivers typically pay an extra fee for the plates,29 which either goes to a
state-designed cause or is split between the state and the group or cause
acknowledged on the plate.' Although available in some states before the
late 1980's,3" the trend towards adopting such programs surged after 1987,
when Florida issued a plate commemorating the space shuttle Challenger.32
Since its issuance, the Challenger plate has generated more that thirty
million dollars for space-related scholarships and research.33 Now, more
than forty states have specialty license plate programs, with some states
offering well over a hundred choices.

Groups that seek specialty plates are generally motivated both by their
money-making potential and the recognition that they bring to the
advertised cause.36 Even if it does not reach the tens of millions generated
28. This distinguishes specialty license plates from so-called "vanity"license plates, on which
drivers can choose their leter/number configuration. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589,
597 n.5 (E.D. La. 2000).
29. FLA. STAT. § 320.08056 (2000) (listing fees for specialty plates offifteen to twenty-five
dollars); State GrabsHalf of FundsRaised by SpecialtyLicense Plates,COPLEY NEWS SERVICE,
Nov. 2, 1999 (stating that California drivers pay from twenty to fifty dollars per year for specialty
plates) [hereinafter State GrabsHaIf].
30. See, e.g., State GrabsHalf,supra note 29 ("Half of the money paid for 'special interest'
license plates doesn't benefit the intended causes" but instead "goes to DMV for overhead or to a
separate fund for other environmental projects.").
31. See, e.g.,Ark. PuttingBrakes on Specialty Vehicle Tags, COM. APPEAL, Apr. 21, 1997,
at B3 ("Specialty tags came to Arkansas in the 1970s'") [hereinafter Ark PuttingBreaks].
32. Carlos Sanchez, Texas Plate Varieties to Reach 100 This Year, FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Aug. 11, 1997, at 8.
33. Ark PuttingBrakes,supra note 31, at B3.
Controversy(NPRradiobroadcast, Apr. 30,
34. NPRMorningEdition:LicensePlateSpeech
1998) (Transcript No. 98043014-210) ("Forty-three states have specialty license plates.") (statement
of Cheryl Devall).
35. See, e.g., Ledyard King, Bill Proposesa "ChooseLife"LicensePlateVIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Jan. 18, 1999, at B5 (stating that Virginia offers "roughly 150 specialty plates"); William Weir,
SpecialInterestsAreBeingGiven License to Fill,HARTRORDCOURANT, June 7,1999, at A3 ("New
York's DMV Web site lists almost 200 different special interest plates.').
36. See, e.g., Suzanne Hoholik, CASA Plates to Aid Abused Children, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEws, Oct. 27,1998, at lB (stating that child abuse license plate campaign's purpose has
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by some of the most popular plates, funding from the plates can literally

"save the day" for many causes.37 Groups view the plates as a means to
"spread the message" to members of the public who are unaware of it,38
and interpret the purchase of plates as an expression of support from the
public.39 Similarly, individuals who buy the plates do so both to help fund
the identified organization or cause, and to publicly express their
ideological support for it.40 According to a spokesperson for 3M, the
company that developed the reflective sheeting that allows for the
manufacture of the plate graphics, specialty plates are "kind of a win-win
deal. People only spend the extra money if they want to.' 41

All states have minimum requirements that groups must meet to apply
for specialty plates. These requirements usually relate to the expected
profitability of the plate. In Florida, for example, organizations must
submit a scientific sample survey indicating that at least 15,000 motor
vehicle owners intend to purchase the plate, 2 an application fee of up to
$60,000 to defray the state's plate-related expenses, 4 and a short-term and

long-term marketing plan and financial analysis outlining anticipated
revenues and planned expenditures." Applicants for specialty plates can
fail at this point in the process by not meeting the profitability guarantee
requirements.45

"two goals: to raise money and to increase awareness of child abuse").
37. See, e.g., Margo Harakas, Some Might Say It's a License to PrintMoney, but Florida's
51 Specialty PlatesHave Raised Almost $157 Millionfor Good Causes... , SUN-SETINEL, May
30, 2000, at ID ("[Florida's] State of the Arts plate.., has pumped more than $270,000 into
Broward County's planned artists' housing project."); Roberta Scruggs, Loon PlatesSave the Day:
Maine Parks Have CashedIn,PORTLAND PREss HERALD, Aug. 10, 1997, at 12D ("The loon plate
arrived to save the day in what many people consider the darkest hour of Maine's park system.").
38. See, e.g., Adriana Colindres, Bill SignedforNew BreastCancerAwarenessPlatesSTATE
L-REG., Aug. 1, 1998, at 6 (explaining that breast cancer awareness plate is "going to spread the
message about mammograms") (quoting an interested citizen).
39. Scruggs, supranote 37, at 12D ("'The [state] employees feel supported by the people of
Maine [who purchase the loon plate].... They're giddy. It's been a wonderful thing."') (quoting
a state official).
40. See, e.g., Hoholik,supranote 36, at l B (asserting that anew Texas child abuse plate "will
let motorists display their concern about child abuse-and do something about it").
41. Harakas, supranote 37, at ID.

42. FLA. STAT. § 320.08053(l)(b) (2000).
43. Id. § 320.08053(1)(c).
44. Id. § 320.08053 (1)(d); see also Robert B. Gunnison, State's Drivers May Have Too
Much on Their Plates, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 1999, at 3/Z1 ("[Specialty] plates need to reach a
5,000 -order threshold before the state can issue them."); SCV South Carolina,supra note 17, at
B2 (explaining that South Carolina requires groups to pay a $4,000 fee to cover initial production
costs or 400 prepaid applications).
45. See, e.g., Gunnison, supranote 44, at 3/ZI ("[California specialty plates] that never saw
the light ofday were plates for the Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary, the Coachella Valley Mountain
Conservancy, the Gene Chappie Heritage Network, the American Heritage Rodeo Foundation and
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Most states also require that specialty plate applications that meet the
minimum requirements be approved in their own pieces of legislation,
meaning that both houses of the legislature must pass them and the
governor must sign them into law.4 Thus, applications for specialty plates
may also fail at one of the numerous stages in the legislative process.47
Unlike in the minimum guidelines noted above, there are rarely articulated
standards to guide elected officials' judgments. 48 To the extent that they
offer explanations for approving or disapproving special plate applications,
their explanations relate generally to their perceptions ofthe public interest
and whether the proposed specialty plate would serve it.49
As with any other law, a decision on a specialty plate application is
subject to the vagaries of the legislative process. Whether a particular
specialty plate makes it through the gauntlet depends most fundamentally
upon the relative strengths and interplay of the political forces in favor of
and opposed to the application.' 0 So, for example, in Arkansas the
legislature refused to authorize specialty plates for the Knights of
Columbus because of fears that other groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan,
would want them, too.51 In California, several years ago, some "wellplaced telephone calls" by Nancy Reagan got a Ronald Reagan Librar
plate approved despite a purported ban on all specialty plate approvals. 2

plates for cars owned by firefighters."); Harakas, supra note 37, at ID (quoting Florida motor
vehicle department spokesperson who stated that application requirements assure that plates are
"not authorized willy-nilly').
46. See, e.g., S. 1329,1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (eliminatingrequirement that
specialty plates be approved by legislature and instead requiring direct application to Department
of Motor Vehicles); Colindres, supra note 38, at 6 (describing specialty plate "signed into law" by
Illinois governor); Hoholik, supra note 36, at lB C'To offer specialty plates, an agency oruniversity
must secure a state lawmaker as a sponsor and win approval from the Legislature.").
47. See, e.g., Michael Gardner, Boy ScoutLicense PlateSplitsLawmakers Over BiasIssue,
COPLEY NEWS SERV., Mar. 14, 2000 ('Tied in political knots by the Boy Scouts, a Senate panel

sidestepped a showdown Tuesday by approving conflicting bills on the issuance of special fundraising license plates."); OrganDonorLicensePlateHonoringPaytonMoves in Senate, STATENET
CAPrrOLJ.-ILL, Mar. 27, 2000 (stating that, although Senate panel approved organ donor specialty
plate in honor of Walter Payton, "[tihe legislation faces an uncertain future in the House").
48. See Sen. Tom Lee, Controversy Over "Choose" License PlateMisses Whole Point of
Choice,PALM BEACHPOST, May 19,1998, at 15A (stating that in Florida, "the Senate has imposed
nine policy questions to ensure that the license plate serves a broad public purpose").
49. See, e.g., id.
50. See, e.g., Dan Walters, A Legislature UnhamperedBy Rules, SAN DM0 UNION-TRIB.,
Aug. 11, 1998, at B-6:l (describing how, despite a ban on passage of new specialty license plate
applications, anothertransportation bill was"hijacked"and an AIDS research specialty license plate
authorization was written in and passed by the legislature).
51. Ark. Putting Brakes,supra note 31, at B3 ("Allowing one group but not another to get
its own tag could lead to a lawsuit.").
52. Carl Ingram, SenatorHopesto DecelerateMove to SpecialtyLicensePlates,LA. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2000, at A24.
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More recently in that state, the Boy Scouts had the legislature "tied in
political knots" as a Senate committee both adopted a broad anti-bias
policy for issuing specialty plates and authorized a plate for the Scouts
even though the group's membership policy violates the provision. 3
According to one side, anyone supporting the anti-discrimination measure
was "voting against the Boy Scouts."' On the other side stood the Senate's
President Pro Tempore, a "San Francisco Democrat [who] represents a
large gay population" and was poised to "use his considerable power to
derail the Boy Scout bill. 55 Even before the Boy Scout dispute arose, the
anti-discrimination rules had been trimmed to remove a reference to
gender discrimination in order "to take care of the Girl Scouts," who also
wanted specialty plates.56 Finally, some states may allow religious
symbols, such as crosses, on specialty plates,5 while others may deem
them too controversial. Explained one Alabama legislator of the
requirement that a white church steeple be removed from a proposed
Martin Luther King, Jr. plate, "We've got to be sure what we do here
doesn't open us up to court suits."5"
B. The CurrentControversies
1. "Choose Life"
The "Choose Life" license plate is the brainchild, so to speak, of
Marion County Commissioner Randy Harris, who conceived the idea in
1996 while stuck in Ocala, Florida traffic.59 In 1997, Harris founded
Choose Life, Inc., a nonprofit organization designed to "work with
interested citizens within Florida and other states to create a specialty
license plate with the slogan 'Choose Life,' the proceeds of which would
be used to facilitate and encourage adoption as a positive choice for
women with unplanned pregnancies. " At the time of its application,
Florida law required the group to raise a $30,000 application fee and obtain

53. Gardner, supra note 47.

54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Some "Free State" supra note 11, at A8 ("Christian crosses [are] the

centerpiece of some other [Maryland Motor Vehicle Association]-approved logos.").
58. Regional News Digest, CHATrANOOGATIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, at B3 (quoting Rep. Jack

Venable).
59. Choose Life, Inc.: About Us, at http:/www.choose-life.orglaboutus.html.
60. Choose Life, Inc.: OurPurpose,at http'lwww.choose-life.orglpurpose.html.
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10,000 signatures. 61 It took the group only 3 weeks to do so.' State
Senator Tom Lee sponsored the bill creating the plate in the Florida
Legislature, where it passed both houses in early 1998.63 Then-Governor
Lawton Chiles vetoed the bill, however, stating, "Simply because a
particular political message is able to garner a majority of votes in the
Florida Legislature does not mean that an official State of Florida license
the proper forum for debate on this-or any other-political
plate is
'
"6
issue.
Later that year, on the campaign trail, gubernatorial candidate Jeb Bush
stated that he would sign such legislation if elected.6 After his election,
Choose Life, Inc. again pressed its specialty plate application. Both houses
of the legislature passed the legislation in 1999, and in that same year the
new Governor Bush signed it into law. 66 On the authorized plate, the words
"Choose Life" appear in childish crayon scrawl across the top, between the
month and year stickers. A similarly colorful crayon-like sketch of smiling
boy and girl faces, bent affectionately together, appears in the right-hand
third of the plate's surface, the same size vertically as the plate's
identifying letter/number configuration.' The extra charge for the plates
is $20 per year, with proceeds designated according to sales by county."
The counties then must distribute the money to not-for-profit agencies that
counsel and meet the needs of pregnant women who are committed to
placing their children for adoption.' The legislation disqualifies
organizations that provide abortion information, in addition to counseling
and assisting women who choose adoption, from receiving funding.7' The
National Organization for Women (NOW), along with others, brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of the state's action.7

61. FLA. STAT. § 320.08053(l)(b)-(c)(1997). The current requirement is a $60,000
application fee and 15,000 signatures. FLA. STAT. § 320.08053(l)(b)-(c)(2000).
62. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2.
63. Id.
64. Press Release, ACLU, Florida ACLU Calls on Goy. Jeb Bush to Veto Two
Unconstitutional Bills (May 7,1999), http'//www.aclu.org/news/1999/n05G799a.html [hereinafter
ACLU Press Release].
65. CNN TalkbackLive: "ChooseLife" LicensePlateCauses Controversyin Florida(CNN
television broadcast, Nov. 29, 1999) (Transcript No. 99112900V14) [hereinafter Talkback Live].
66. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2.
67. See Choose Life License Plate,at http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/specialtytags/tagchoose.
html.
68. See id.
69. FLA. STAT. § 320.08058 (2000).
70. Talkback Live, supra note 65.
71. NOW brought three different lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the state's
approval of the plate. Cristin Kellogg, Pro-life FloridiansFightfor Right to Drive Home a Point;
NOW Stalls "Choose Life" Plates, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at A2 ('ro date, NOW has
mounted three lawsuits to keep Florida from being the first state in the country to sport the two-
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The crux of the free speech claim against the state72 is that the plate
represents an unconstitutional government choice to support an antiabortion message. 73 The government's response has several aspects. First,
although Choose Life, Inc., is backed by anti-abortion groups such as
Florida Right to Life,74 and amendments to change the wording to "Choose
Adoption" were defeated several times in the legislature, 5 the plates'
supporters consistently deny that the specialty plate sends an anti-abortion
message.76 The law's initial author contends that the license plate "has
nothing to do with a woman's right to choose an abortion."r States the
Choose Life spokesperson, "We are not in the pro-life/pro-choice debate.
This is a pro-adoption plate., 7 ' According to Governor Bush when asked
about the plate after signing it into law, "It's a pretty tag, and it says
'Choose Life,' and it's for79adoption. If people want to politicize that,
they'll politicize anything."
A second strain of the argument supporting the constitutionality of the
"Choose Life" plates is that it is but one of many Florida specialty plates
that bear a variety of different messages. Although many of these plates
signify affiliation with particular state schools or support for professional
sports teams,80 others contain messages, such as advocating support for
environmental causes or protecting endangered species,81 which are as

word slogan above its car bumpers.... [Two of the lawsuits have been dismissed or defeated.").
72. After the initial free speech clause challenges failed, see Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *21 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999), NOW brought
another suit, arguing that the plates also violate the establishment clause because the money that
they bring in primarily aids religious organizations. Foes of "Choose Life" PlateAsk Court to
Recall 13,000, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at 5B ("Abortion rights advocates asked a
judge Thursday to recall a 'Choose Life' auto tag, saying the state has issued a tag with a biblical
message quoted by anti-abortion activists.").
73. Talkback Live, supra note 65 ("It's a bill that very specifically talks about abortion and
really is a state-sanctioned campaign against the right to choose abortion.") (statement of Elizabeth
Toledo of NOW).
74. All Things Considered(NPR radio broadcast Aug. 22,2000) (stating that Choose Life,
Inc. "has the backing of anti-abortion groups like Florida Right to Life and conservative Christian
groups statewide") (statement of Philip Davis) [hereinafter All Things Considered].
75. Talkback Live, supra note 65.
76. See, e.g., id ("Well, see, I don't look at it as the state 'taking a side.' I look at it as the
state allowing individuals that would like to purchase a plate that does help adoptions it [sic] to be
able to do that.") (statement ofTomGallagher, FloridaEducation Commissioner); see also Kellogg,
supra note 9, at A2 ("The plates are not 'anti-' anything.") (statement of House bill sponsor Rep.
Bev Kilmer).
77. Lee, supra note 48, at 15A.
78. All Things Considered,supra note 74 (statement of Russ Amerling).
79. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2.
80. See Specialty License Plates'Index, at http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/specialtytags
/specialindex. html (listing 14 university plates and I1 professional sports team plates).
81. Id. (Environmental cause plates include: "Conserve Wildlife," "Everglades River of
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"political" and "controversial" as "Choose Life."' 2 That the state facilitates
a wide variety ofgroups and messages and that individual drivers have free
choice to decide to pay the extra fee to support the organization or message
renders state approval of any particular plate constitutional. Pursuant to
this strain of argument, the appropriate response of citizens who do not
like the "Choose Life" message is not a lawsuit, but is to seek recognition
of their own group and message through the specialty plate process." At
the same time, however, in response to concerns that a completely wideopen approval process could put undesirable messages on the state's
roadways, legislators emphasize safeguards in the authorization procedure.
According to the senator who sponsored the "Choose Life" plate,
"legislative criteria" that ensure that a plate serves a broad public purpose
"protect Floridians from those who might attempt to use the specialty
license plate statute to advertise a negative fringe idea."s"
The third strain of the argument in support of the constitutionality of
the "Choose Life" plate emphasizes the discretion inherent in the
legislative process. Under this line of argument, the creation of a particular
specialty plate is a legislative act that requires no further constitutional
justification than that enough votes existed to pass it.' That other

Grass:' "Indian River Lagoon," "Large Mouth Bass" "Manatee," "Panther," "Protect Wild
Dolphins," "SeaTurtle," 'TampaBayEstuary,"and "State Wildflower."Miscellaneous causeplates
include: "Agriculture," "Boy Scouts,""Challenger," "FloridaArts," "FloridaEducational;""Florida
Salutes Veterans," "Florida Sheriffs Youth Ranches," "Florida Special Olympics," "Girl Scouts,"
"Invest in Children," "Keep Kids Drug Free," "Share the Road," "Political Athletic League," "U.S.
Olympic," and "U.S. Marine Corps").
82. See TalkbackLive, supranote 65 ("Well, you know, I look at it, there are people that are
very interested in saving manatees, and I will tell you there is an other (sic] side that politically
[sic]. Some of the boat manufacturers and boat owners don't like the idea that they have to go at
a very slow no-wake speed to protect manatees. They want to run their boats as fast as they can. It's
a highly political issue. So it's as political as anything else.') (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida
Education Commissioner).
83. See ACLU Press Release, supra note 64 (arguing that the state can choose to allow
political slogans on license plates, but that "once that is done the Constitution does not permit the
State to discriminate in the future on the basis of viewpoint").
84. Talfback Live, supra note 65 ("They want to give and talk about using abortion as a
method of birth control, which I think is not a good thing to be promoting, but they have the right
to go to the legislature and ask to do that. And they could get the money from it.") (statement of
Tom Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner).
85. Lee, supranote 48, at 15A; see also TalkbackLive, supra note 65 (stating that the entire
approval process provides assurance "on having a reasonable group").
86. TalkbackLivesupranote65(Floridahasthe"ChoosetIfe"specialtyplate"becausethey
had the votes to have a tag to help fund adoptions as an alternative. I don't see a problem with
that.') (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner).
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organizations apply and "simply don't make it through the process" is
explicable as an appropriate result of the democratic system.
Shortly after the legislature authorized the "Choose Life" specialty
plates, the state ordered the manufacture of 10,000 of the plates, intending
to distribute them as soon as they became available. 8 In one of the lawsuits
challenging the state's action, a state judge preliminarily enjoined the
distribution of the plates.89 But after the appellate court held that the case
should be transferred to a different jurisdiction, the state determined that
"the status of the law is that there is no legal impediment to the sale of the
[plates]."' As the plates were being sold, a state circuit court judge
continued to consider the plantiffs' claims.9"
Initial sales of the "Choose Life" specialty plate have been brisk. The
state sold 750 plates in the first week that it was offered, and in the first
twenty weeks sales of the plate generated $200,000V' Choose Life, Inc. is
actively advertising the availability of the plates,' reminding drivers that
they need not wait until their renewal date to get the plates and offering a
packet of reproducible flyers for those who want to "spread the word."'
It also plans to place billboards around the state publicizing the availability
of the specialty plates and encouraging Floridians to "take a STAND for
Life."" It seeks sponsors of "pro-life billboards" to collaborate in the
effort.97
Choose Life, Inc. seeks to extend the specialty license plate effort
beyond Florida. It claims to be in communication with groups and
individuals in thirty-five states that are interested in beginning the process
and notes that license plate bills have been before legislatures of eleven
additional states in the past year.98 In Virginia, a bill with the same crayon

87. Id. (statement of Del. Richard Black, responding to whether legislature would have to
grant the KKK a specialty tag).
88. Judge DelaysSale of ChooseLife Tags,STUART NLWrs, Feb. 9,2000, at B5 (explaining
that the state had ordered plates and planned to begin distributing them in March).
89. See id.
(explaining that a judge blocked distribution of Florida's new "Choose Life"
license plates while she decided whether they amount to "a political statement against abortion").
90. All Things Considered, supra note 74 (statement of Robert Sanchez, Florida State
Highway Dep't).
91. Choose Life Update,athttp://www.choose-life.orgnewsletter.html [hereinafter Choose
Life Update] (NOW v. State of Florida & Dep't of Transp., Case No. CV 001953, before Circuit
Judge Nikki Ann Clarke).
92. All Things Considered,supranote 74.
93. Choose life Update, supranote 91.

94. Id. ("We have begun an extensive statewide grassroots advertising effort to spread the
word about the new Choose Life license plate.").
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Douglas Belkin, "ChooseLife" CarTagsStirringUp DebateOverAnti-AbortionEfforts,
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drawing graphics as Florida passed the House and the Senate, but became

fatally stalled on the issue of wording. 9 The bill passed the House after
being changed from "Choose Life" to "Choose Adoption,"'" ° although its
sponsor hoped to change the wording back once the plate won Senate
approval.' The Senate Committee, however, wanted to change the word
"choose" as well."12 According to the House sponsor's legislative assistant,
"Some of the people in the Senate were nervous because other House
members were making the argument that if there is a pro-life tag then there

could be a pro-abortion tag." 03 When faced with the prospect of losing
both words, the bill's sponsor removed it from consideration, vowing to
introduce it again.104
In only one other state, Louisiana, has the specialty plate authorization
been signed into law. Says an organizer of that "Choose Life" license plate
campaign, "It's easy to get these things done in Louisiana because we have
a very pro-life legislature.""'5 The bill in fact passed both houses of the
legislature unanimously." In addition to the "Choose Life" motto, the

Louisiana plate features a baby wrapped in a blanket dangling from the
beak of the state bird, the brown pelican."° The extra charge for the plate
is $25 per year, which, as in Florida, is to go to organizations that provide

"counseling and other services intended to meet the needs of expectant

mothers considering adoption for their unborn child. ' ' "°s And, as in Florida,
organizations "involved in counseling for, or referrals to abortion clinics,
CHA'TANOOGA TIMES, July 23, 2000, at A15 ("Bills authorizing 'Choose Life' license plates have
been proposed in at least 10 states, said Russ Amerling, vice president of the organization.");
Choose Life Update, supra note 91 ('This year Choose Life license plates went before the
Legislatures of California, Texas, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, West Virginia,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama and Ohio."); Robert Whereatt, The WeekAhead,
STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 2001, at 5B (Minnesota considers "Choose Life" plate).
99. Belkin, supranote 98, atAl5 ("In Virgiia, state delegate Richard Blacksponsored abill
using Florida's 'Choose Life' design.").
100. Talkback Live, supra note 65 ("[W]e had to accept a modification to get it out of the
House of Delegates.") (statement of Del. Richard Black).
101. Id. ("[W]e had hoped to get it through the House of Delegates and hopefully to modify
it back at a later time.') (statement of Del. Richard Black).
102. Id. (stating that the Senate committee "simply could not accept the word 'choose"')

(statement of Del. Richard Black).
103. Kellogg,supranote9, atA2(quotingSteveWhitener, legislative assistantto Del. Richard
Black).
104. Belkin, supranote 98, at A15 ("The Senate didn't like the word life, and they didn't like
the word choose. They changed it to something like family friendly, so Ihad it stricken.") (quoting
Del. Richard Black).
105. Id. (quoting Peg Kenny).
106. See Steve Ritea, Anti-Abortion License PlateDrawingFire, IMES-PICAYUNE, July 19,
2000, at Al (stating that sponsor of specialty plate bill watched it pass unanimously).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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providing medical abortion-related procedures, or pro-abortion
advertising" are disqualified from receiving funding. 9 Organizations that
receive money from the "Choose Life" fund within the state treasury will
be chosen by the "Choose Life Advisory Council," which, like the fund,
is created by the plate-authorizing legislation. The Council will include the
president or designee of the American Family Association, the Louisiana
Family Forum and Concerned Women of America, as well as other
members chosen by them. °
The New York-based Center for Reproductive Law and Policy brought
suit on behalf of local residents and others,"' challenging the
constitutionality of the plates. Like the Florida plaintiffs, they raised both
free speech and establishment clause claims. u 2 On August 29, 2000, a
federal district court issued a preliminary injunction directing the state to
halt production of the "Choose Life" plate,"3 finding that the
plantiffs were
114
likely to succeed on the merits of their free speech claim.
Like the Florida plaintiffs, the Louisiana plaintiffs argued that, by
authorizing the "Choose Life" specialty plate, the state unconstitutionally
supported one point of view on a controversial public issue.1" Louisiana' s
response differed in emphasis from Florida's. Rather than arguing about
whether the plate "takes a side" on a controversial issue, Louisiana
officials largely concede that the message expresses a particular
viewpoint." 6 The Louisiana representative who sponsored the legislation
frankly acknowledged that the plate's message is anti-abortion. 17 And,
although the state argued that the availability of many specialty plates
rendered the "Choose Life" plate constitutional, it primarily emphasized
that the plate's message is valid because it is a reflection of the state's own

109. Id.
110. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592 (E.D. La. 2000), stay denied 2000 WL

1875987 (E.D. La. 2000).
111. Id. at 592 n.2; Judge TemporarilyBlocks "ChooseLife" License Plates,CHATTANOOGA
TIMES, Aug. 30,2000, at A2 (explaining that suit was brought on behalf of New Orleans residents
Russell J. Henderson, Doreen Keeler, Rabbi Robert H. Loewy, and the Greater New Orleans
Section of the National Council of Jewish Women).
112. Henderson, 112F.Supp.2dat591.
113. Id.at592.
114. Id. at 596.
115. Id. at 593; Joe Gyan, Jr., Attorney Argues Against State's Specialty Plate, THE
ADVOCATE, Aug. 24,2000, at 1B (setting forth plaintiffs' attorney's argument that specialty plates
approved by Louisiana legislature "[i]n general. .. don't express a viewpoint," but, with the
"Choose Life" plate, the legislature has "gone a step further").
116. Henderson, 112F. Supp. 2d at598 ("[D]efendants have madeclearby theirargument that

there is no intent to be viewpoint neutral.').
117. Ritea, supra note 106, at Al (stating that the plate is appropriate for Louisiana because
the state "is, traditionally, a very anti-abortion state") (quoting Rep. Shirley Bowler).
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convictions."' According to the state, specialty license plates do not create
a forum for private speech. 19 Instead, every specialty plate, because it is
authorized "through [the state's] democratic process of legislative
enactments," contains an "official statutory [message] by the state itself,"
which the state "makes... available to those who choose an alternative
state message instead of the one on the basic license plate."'" As
government speech, specialty plate authorizations are not subject to the
rule that prohibits viewpoint discrimination among private viewpoints. 1
Rather, argues Louisiana, the state may, "pursuant to 2democratic
processes, ... [express] a preference for normal childbirth."'
The district court in Florida dismissed the plate challengers' free speech
claim as not ripe, because the plaintiffs had not applied for a pro-choice
license plate.1' It also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the
specialty program and the "Choose Life" plate authorization at issue
created opportunities for some to speak without limiting others' speech in
any way." The district court in Louisiana rejected both of these
arguments.1 5 According to that court, "[b]y the very act of injecting 'the
State's position which has been legislatively sanctioned' into a forum, First
Amendment injury occurs."'2 6 And, "[o]nce a forum has been created
which allows viewpoint discrimination, it is unconstitutional from the
moment the discriminatory forum is created."' 27 Therefore, no pro-choice
plate application was necessary for plaintiffs to bring their challenge."n
2. Confederate Flag Plates
The Confederate flag specialty plate dispute began in Maryland. Unlike
most states, which require legislative approval of specialty plates,
Maryland allows its Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) to issue

118. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 593-95.
119. Id. at 595.
120. Id. (quoting Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *21
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999).
124. Id. at *20.
125. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
126. Id. at 601.
127. Id.
128. Id. ("Once free speech has been abridged in such a manner, there is no case law
supporting the proposition that those individuals whose speech has been restrained in this particular
forum must wait, a week, a month, or a year to have an opportunity to express an opposing

viewpoint in that forum."); Gyan, supranote 115, at lB (noting that a plaintiffs' attorney conceded
that clients had not applied for a pro-choice plate but argued "that it would be 'futile' to get
Louisiana lawmakers to vote for such a plate").
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specialty plates to non-profit organizations that meet the qualification
guidelines." 9 Over 350 specialty license plates, either with an
organization's name and logos or with the name only, are available in
Maryland. 0 Organizations that have such plates include
alumni and alumnae groups, volunteer fire departments,
veterans' groups (e.g., Vietnam Veterans of America), ...
business groups and unions, churches and religiously
affiliated groups (e.g., B'nai B'rith, Grace Baptist Church,
and the Muslim American Community), political parties (both
the Maryland Republican and Democrat parties and the
Libertarian Party), and cause-advocating interest groups (e.g.,
the National Rifle Association)."
Organizations generally can choose whether to apply for "name-only" or
"logo" specialty plates, with the latter costing slightly more.132 Before the
Confederate flag logo controversy, the MVA had denied logo plates to two
organizations, the Royal Order of Jesters, which wanted a naked Buddha,
and the Anne Arundel County Professional Firefighters, which wanted the
letters "FU."1 3 These organizations obtained name-only plates instead 34
In June 1995, forty-two members of the SCV applied for a specialty
plate. 35 The SCV is a non-profit organization ofmen who can demonstrate
1 36
that an ancestor served honorably for the Confederacy in the Civil War.
The SCV is a historical and educational organization dedicated to
"preserving and explaining Confederate heritage in proper historical
perspective," which "publicly condemns racism and all hate groups."137 In
December 1996, the MVA issued seventy-eight plates with the SCV's

129. MD. CODE ANN., Transp. II § 13-619 (2000).
130. Marina Sarris, MVA Won't Challenge Judge'sRuling on Tags: Group Allowed to Keep

Confederate-LogoPlates, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 27, 1997, at 2B (noting that 358 groups have
special organizational plates) [hereinafter MVA Won't Challenge]; Marina Sarris, MVA to Revoke
License Tags Bearing Confederate Flags: Complaints Led to Agency Action Against Plates,
BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 3,1997, at IA (noting that 215 organizations have logo plates and 128 have

name-only plates) [hereinafter MVA to Revoke].
131. William J. Mertens, Battle Over the Battle Flag,LEALTIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 35.
132. MVA to Revoke, supranote 130, at lA (noting that name-only plates cost $12, while logo
plates cost $15).
133. Id.
134. id.
135. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (D. Md.
1997).
136. Id.
137. Curtis A. Carter, ConfederateFlagandFreeSpeech, COURIER-J., Mar. 25,1997, at I lA.
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name and logo, 3 8 which for over 100 years has included the Confederate
flag.139 On the plate, the flag occupied approximately a two-inch square.' 4
It was after issuance of the plates that members of the legislature
became involved.' 4 ' The legislature's Black Caucus joined with the state's
NAACP to ask the MVA to recall the plates. 42 The MVA did so,
explaining that its decision was "based on numerous, substantial
complaints ... about the apparent negative racial connotations of the logo
design displayed on the plate." 43 It offered, however, to consider another
SCV application proposing "logo artwork with an alternative design that
is not perceived as racist."'" According to the MVA Administrator, who
is an African-American, "I personally do not find the logo or the
Confederate battle flag objectionable, but that's not the issue. There are a
large number of Maryland citizens who find it objectionable, and we are
a state agency, so it's our responsibility to be sensitive to the concerns of
the public."' 45 Said GovernorParris N. Glendening, supporting the MVA's
recall decision, "The Confederate
flag has taken on a symbolism over the
146
years that many of us reject."'
The SCV sued, arguing that the MVA's recall violated its free speech
rights. 47 In "the near record time of 33 days,"' 4 the case went from
complaint to a permanent injunction order issued without hearing. 49 The
court held that the MVA recall of the SCV plates was unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination, "advanc[ing] the viewpoint of those offended by
the flag and discourag[ing] the viewpoint of those proud of it."'" ° The
138. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1100.

139. Id.
140. Bonna M. de la Cruz, Senators OK Rebel License Tag, TENNESSEAN, May 18, 1999, at
IA (noting that Tennessee bill used Maryland plate as a model, which included the two-inch flag,
and that, according to the bill's sponsor, Sen. Bobby Carter, "You can't hardly see it.").
141. Some "Free State," supra note 11, at A8 ("A state senator accused Maryland of

sanctioning a 'racist symbol."').
142. See Tom Stuckey, ConfederateSymbol on License PlatesBrings Protestsin Maryland,
AUSTtN AMER.-STATESMAN, Dec. 28, 1996, at A4 ("Maryland doesn't need to go backwards with
this Jim Crow mess.") (quoting Sen. Larry Young, chairman of the Legislative Black Caucus); id.
("'We in the NAACP are surprised and disappointed that a state agency would cooperate in

perpetuating such symbols as this one."') (quoting Hanley Norment, president of the state chapter
of the NAACP).
143. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1100 (quoting PIs' Mem. In Supp. Ex. 11).
144. Id. at 1101 (quoting PIs' Mere. In Supp. Ex. 11).
145. MVA to Revoke, supra note 130, at IA.
146. Id.
147. Carter, supra note 137, at IlA.
148. Id. (stating that the case was "clear-cut" according to SCV member).
149. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1099 ("In view of the thorough briefing, no hearing is
necessary under the Rules of this Court."); id. at 1101 ("Defendants have requested that the Court
forego ruling on the preliminary injunction motion and reach the merits of the issues.").
150. Id. at 1104.
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MVA decided not to appeal the district court's decision."' The
Confederate battle flag specialty plates remain available in Maryland. 52
For a period of time, approval of any further applications was delayed
while the MVA and the legislature considered changes to the specialty
plate program. A House ofDelegates committee, however, killed abill that
would have abolished specialty plates, which, as one reporter noted, "are
popular among some politically connected university alumni, veteran and
fraternal groups." '53
At around the same time as the Maryland controversy, SCV also
applied for a specialty plate in North Carolina. There, the Division of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) initially refused the SCV's application after
determining that it was not a "civic club" within the meaning of the
legislature's authorization.'-" The SCV filed suit in state court, where the
trial judge held that the SCV met the statutory criteria and directed the
DMV to issue the plates. 55 The appellate court affirmed, on state statutory
grounds. 56 It reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees to the SCV,
however, noting that DMV's positions were not "mere excuses for
arbitrary behavior."157 As to the state's authority to deny the SCV a
specialty plate on other grounds, the court noted, "Whether the display of
the Confederate flag on state-issued license plates represents sound public
policy is not an issue presented to this Court in this case. That is an issue
for our General Assembly." ' It cautioned, however, that "allowing some
organizations which fall within [the statutory] criteria to obtain
personalized plates while disallowing others equally within the criteria
could implicate the First Amendment's restriction against content-based
'
restraints on free speech."159
SCV specialty plates, including the Confederate flag logo, are also
16
available in a number of other states, including Alabama and Georgia. 0
In South Carolina, the SCV was the first to qualify for a specialty plate
under a new procedure, which moved the application decisions from the

151. MVA Won't Challenge,supra note 130, at 2B.
152. Id.
153. Marina Sarris, Ruling Allowing Confederate Plates Won't Be Challenged, HOUSTON
CHRON., Mar. 28, 1997, at 11.
154. N.C. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Faulkner, 509 S.E.2d 207,209 (N.C. Ct.

App. 1998) ("The Commissioner reached this decision after comparing the purposes and activities
of SCV with 'the statutory language and examples of qualifying civic organizations.").
155. Id.
156. Id. at 211 ("[A]s SCV-NCD meets the four criteria enumerated by our General
Assembly.... SCV-NCD qualifies for special registration plates.").
157. Id. at 212.
158. Id.at209n.1.
159. Id.
160. SCV South Carolina,supra note 17, at B2.
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legislature to the Department of Public Safety. 161 The new law allows any
nonprofit group to create specialty plates by submitting a $4,000 fee or 400
prepaid applications. 62
Other states have refused to approve the SCV plates, or have approved
them without the flag logo. 163 In two of these states, Virginia' 64 and
Tennessee, 65 the SCV has responded with federal litigation. The SCV
applied for a specialty plate in Virginia in 1998. The bill was held over
until the next legislative session, and the SCV spent this time lobbying
legislators."6 When the House Transportation Committee considered the
measure, over 100 SCV members attended. The committee heard
testimony from the SCV's state commander, as well as several AfricanAmericans who told of their pride in the Confederate cause of "states'
rights and tariffs" and its flag symbol. 67 It then approved the SCV plate
bill by a 21-2 vote." 's The one African-American legislator who voted in
favor of the bill, Del. William P. Robinson, the committee's chair and
longtime leader of the Assembly's Black Caucus,' 69 explained that he
"feared the state might be sued for discrimination if the request was
and
the General Assembly could not "be saddled with a
denied" 17
0
lawsuit.'
The transportation committee then sent the bill to the House of
Delegates. Before the vote, however, Robinson called for and conducted
an "unprecedented"' 71 additional hearing before the Transportation
Committee "to give the public a chance to speak at a forum during the

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Todd Jackson, Confederate Group to Sue State Over License PlateDesign, ROANOKE

TIaES, May 6,1999, at B1.
164. Id.
165. Lawrence Buser, Confederate Sons Defend Position on CarTags in Lawsuit Against
Tenn., COM. APPEAL, Sept. 18, 1999, at A12.

166. Pamela Stallsmith, PlatesWould HonorConfederate Veterans: Issue to be Among First
to Face 1999 Session of GeneralAssembly, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 1999, at B 1.
167. Linda McNatt, "Sons" Say Flaga Sign of Pride,Not Prejudice; ConfederateGroups
Want Rebel Flagto Fly Again-OnLicense Plates,ViRGINIAN-PLOT, Jan. 18, 1999, at B 1; Pamela

Stallsmith, Black Rebels' Kin Pleadfor Specialty Plate; Some Find Flag Racially Offensive,
RICHMOND T1Es-DISPATCH, Jan. 22, 1999, at A12.

168. Todd Jackson, Group Hoists Rebel Flag in New Fight; Civil Rights Disputes Drive
DebateAbout LicensePlates,ROANOKE TMS, Jan. 21, 1999, at Al.
169. Two other African-American committee members were absent at the time of the vote.

Donald P. Baker, ConfederatePlate Effort Enlists Two Black Men, WASH. POsT, Jan. 22, 1999, at
B 1. Del. William P. Robinson, who voted for the bill in committee, later explained that he voted
for it"at that time," and indicated that he was not prepared to say how he would vote in the General
Assembly. Id.
170. Jackson, supranote 168, at Al.
171. Stallsmith, supra note 167, at A12.
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legislative session that would attract more media attention."'" Again, SCV
members predominated in the audience, and the same African-American
spokespersons supported the bill." The state's NAACP director testified
against it, arguing that the flag "represents intimidation, terror, lynching
and has been [appropriated] by hate groups and white supremacy
groups.

17 4

The House of Delegates, too, heard testimony in favor of and opposed
to the SCV's license plate application. It was the "spellbinding speech" of
Del. Jerrauld C. Jones, head of the state's Legislative Black Caucus, that
"compelled" a legislative compromise approving the plate but without the
flag logo.17 He told of riding the bus as a six-year-old past a Ku Klux Klan
rally, where he saw the Confederate flag waving176next to a burning cross.
"You could smell the fear on this bus," he said.
The SCV enlisted the aid of the Rutherford Institute to sue the state,
demanding that it issue the plate with the flag logo.'n During the
legislative process, the SCV had rejected the compromise suggestion that
the group use an alternate Confederate symbol such as the Great Seal or
the first Confederate flag. 178To give up its trademarked symbol, the group
argued, would be "admitting it was racist or something to be ashamed of
and we're not going to do that."' 79 Instead, the plates would provide "an
opportunity to re-educate others about the flag's heritage and history," as
well as "an opportunity to polish the image of the[] beloved flag, tarnished
by misunderstanding."' "WSimilarly, when the legislature approved the plate
without the logo, SCV members refused to buy it. "Why would we want
a tag without our logo?" the head of the Virginia SCV asked.' "A tag
without that logo is just a plain tag." 8 2
In its lawsuit, the SCV contended, as it did in Maryland, that Virginia's
specialty plate program is a public forum for private speech, in which the
government cannot censor an application simply because members of the

172. Baker, supra note 169, at B1.
173. Id.
174. Stallsmith, supra note 167, at A12.
175. Holly A. Heyser & Mike Knepler, Jones Expected to Run for LieutenantGovernor,
VIRG4IMN-PilOT, Aug. 8,2000, at A16.

176. Id.
177. Todd Jackson, Confederate Group to Sue Over License Plate Design: They Want to
Include Battle FlagofArmy of Northern Virginia, ROANOKE TzMEs, May 6, 1999, at B1.

178. Stallsmith, supra note 166, at B1.
179. Id.
180. McNatt,supranote 167, atBi.
181. Rex Bowman, State Asking Judge to Dismiss Rebel Flag Suit, RICHMOND
DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 1999, atB5.

TIM s-

182. Bowman, supra note 19, at B5.
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public find it offensive. 18 3 The state countered that the specialty plate
program "does not create an automatic entitlement" to a plate.' s4 Rather,
what appears on license plates is a "form of 'government speech,' that the
state can control."'" The district court ruled in favor of the SCV, finding
Confederate flag
specialty plates to be private speech and denial of the
6
discrimination.1
viewpoint
logo to be impermissible
Around the time of the Virginia application, the SCV also applied for
a specialty plate in Tennessee. There, the state Senate voted 28-2 to

approve

it187

The two "no" votes came from Sen. Steve Cohen, who

commented that, "[i]t's insensitive to African-Americans," and Sen.
Thelma Harper, the only African-American senator who voted on the
measure."s After Senate approval, the bill moved to the House. 9 In that
body, the Calendar Committee killed it, after several African-American
legislators objected to the Confederate flag appearing on state license
plates.19
The SCV again filed a federal lawsuit, making the same arguments as
it did in Virginia. 91 Like the Virginia legislature, the Tennessee legislature
has approved applications from a wide range of organizations for specialty
plates." Any group with at least 500 members willing to purchase the
plates can petition the legislature for specialty plate approval. 93 Based
upon the apparently open application and approval process,' 94 the SCV
argued that state officials have "unlawfully drawn distinctions" in failing
to approve the group's specialty plate application. 95

183. Rex Bowman, Group UrgesFastActionon Plate:Asks Judgeto Skip Tra OrderDMV
to Make Flag Tags, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 5, 2000, at B8.
184. Bowman, supra note 181, atB5.
185. Bowman, supra note 183, at B8.
186. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, No. 7:99CV00530, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 538, at *5-21 (W.D. Va. Jan. 18, 2001); Craig Timberg, Virginia Loses Suit on License
Plates;Commemorative Tags to PortrayConfederate Logo, WASH. PosT, Jan. 19,2001, at BI.
187. de IaCruz, supra note 140, at IA.
188. Id. ("You know the kinds of attitudes those have proclaimed and the kinds of attitudes

they've expressed toward certain groups,' Harper said. 'It was better to vote "no."").
189. Tom Humphrey, SundquistAssails "NeanderthalThinking"; Says Reform Opposition
May Lose Seats, KNOXVI.LE NEWS-SNI-, Oct. 15, 1999, at A3.
190. id.
191. Buser, supra note 165, at A12.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Commins, supranote20, atB2. ("[A]s farasheknows, theSons ofConfederateVeterans
plate was the only specialty plate that has not been approved by the legislature.") (quoting Rep.
Steve McDaniel, sponsor of the SCV plate application).
195. Buser, supranote 165, atA12.
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In addition to specialty plates for organizations, the Tennessee
legislature approves and makes available cause-related plates as well.' 96
The legislature is now considering a bill to create an "I have a dream" plate
with the quote and an image of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.1 9 Profits from
the plates would be earmarked for the National Civil Rights Museum,
formerly the Lorraine Motel, in Memphis, where King was slain in 1968.191
The bill's sl9nsor is Sen. Steve Cohen,199 who voted against the SCV
application. "The license plates will allow Tennesseans to show their
support of the positive and uplifting ideals Dr. King expressed and will
provide a voluntary means of funding educational programs," Cohen
explained. 21
IEL THE CONSTrTUTONAL CATEGORmS
A. Government Speech and the DemocraticProcess
The Constitution permits the government to "speak for itself."2
Governments indeed do so in many ways. 2° 3Government officials speak,
government agencies inform and advise, government commissions publish
reports, and legislatures hold hearings and enact and defend legislation that
embodies particular public policies. These types of government speech are
necessarily "selective" among a range of viewpoints on controversial
issues of public concern-they identify and advocate the "government's
position"
without giving equal time or access to competing points of
view. 2°

196. Commins, supra note 20, at B2.

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.

200. de la Cruz, supra note 140, at 1A.
201. Commins, supra note 20, at B2.
202. Bd. ofRegentsof Univ. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,229 (2000) (indicating
that "the government can speak for itself," and when it does so, the constitutionality of its action

is "evaluated on (that] premise" rather than on the premise that it is regulating private speech). See
generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983); Steven Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).
203. See, e.g., YUDOP, supranote 202, at 13 ("'hemodes and types of government discourse
include.., direct access to the broadcast media, mass distribution ofdocuments, speeches and other
activities of political leaders reported in the private media, the gathering and dissemination of
statistics and research results, advertising, preparation and dissemination of official reports,
activities of government public-relations offices, dissemination of official records of government
proceedings, press conferences, public schooling, military training, and so on.").
204. See David Cole, Beyond UnconstitutionalConditions:ChartingSpheresofNeutralityin
Government-FundedSpeech, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 675, 681 (1992) ("[Non-neutral government
support of speech is often necessary in running a democratic government").
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Through these expressions, the government often seeks not only to
inform, but also to persuade listeners to adopt the government's position.'
Sometimes the government directs these efforts outside of its boundaries
to pursue presumably shared interests of its constituents. The National
Endowment for Democracy, established by Congress to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles, is such an example.' More
often, however, the government directs such efforts towards its own
citizens, attempting to convince them to eat or avoid certain foods,' to get
vaccinated, to stop smoking,2 9 or to "Just Say No" to drugs.10
The government's authority to speak, whether to inform, educate or
persuade, stems from the political process. The government may speak to
"promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea" because "it is,
in the end, accountable to the electorate via the political process for its
advocacy.921 1 Not only does the political system established in the
Constitution justify government speech, it arguably demands it. If
governments are to perform the many varied functions that they now
perform, they simply must be able to communicate. Because the process
of governing involves constant decisionmaking on controversial public
issues, governments' communications will relate to these topics.
That a particular issue is subject to current, heated, public debate does
not disqualify the government from "taking sides." Specifically, the
government can, through the political processes, decide to favor childbirth

205. See, e.g., YUDOF,supra note 202, at 14 ("IThere are a variety of ways government may
attempt to influence behavior in accordance with its legitimate authority.").
206. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (noting that, when Congress established
the Endowment, "it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing

lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism").
207. SeeRosie Mestel, The FoodPyramid:DoesltMissthePoint?,L.A.TIMES, Sept. 1,2000,

at Al (explaining that the government published "first dietary guidelines" in 1980, "which are the
basis for government nutrition and education programs today").
208. See David G. Savage, Measles Epidemic Quelled, OfficialsSay, LA. TIMEs, Aug. 21,

1992, at A22 (explaining that vaccination campaign reduced incidence of measles).
209. See Ian Trontz, Teens Tackle Smoking Among Peers,PALMBEACHPOST, Mar. 29,1998,
at 1 B ("About 600 students from across the state will design an advertising campaign to stop

children from smoking. Money from Florida's $11.3 billion tobacco settlement will pay for the
program.").
210. See Jennings Parrott, FirstFamily StressesThree Little Words: JustSay No, LA.TIMES,

May 21, 1986, at 1-2 ("During a White House Ceremony after Congress proclaimed 'Just Say No
Week,' [President] Reagan praised the Firt Lady" for "her campaign for young people to 'just say
no' to drugs.").
211. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,235 (2000).
212. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supranote 202, at 606 ("If government is to secure cooperation in
implementing its programs, if it is to be able to maintain a dialogue with its citizens about their
needs and the extent to which government can or should meet those needs, government must be
able to communicate.").
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over abortion.213 It can then, through its own speech, attempt to persuade
pregnant women to choose the government-favored option. 4 Presumably,
a government can decide to advocate the opposite view as well. Similarly,
the government can decide either to use or not to use a particular symbol,
and can consider, in making its decision, whether members of the public
perceive the symbol to be "offensive" or "racist." The controversy over the
use of the Confederate flag by several southern state governments
illustrates this process. On the one hand, the Constitution does not forbid
a government from choosing to fly the flag over its capitol." 5 On the other
hand, neither does it invalidate a government's decision to remove the flag
because many citizens object to its apparent meaning. 2 6 With respect to
both of these controversies, the principle of political accountability allows
the government to choose and advocate a particular viewpoint.
B. PrivateSpeech ForumsaridMinority Speech Protections
The First Amendment's guarantee of "freedom of speech 217 protects
private speakers from government actions that suppress their points of
view.21 8 The core value protected by the free speech guarantee is "the free
'
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."219
Free private speech is central to the legitimacy of democratic government,
which rests on the faith that citizens choose the rulers, and thus the rules,
that structure their actions. 2" The prime threat to this value of free private
speech is a powerful government that acts as a censor, distorting the
content of public debate." From these tenets comes the core free speech
213. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992).
214. Id. at 883 (stating that government can require physicians to inform pregnant women of

government-produced literature that provides information about fetal development, but which
requirement is for the purpose of persuading women to choose childbirth over abortion).
215. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561-62(llth Cir. 1990).
216. Cf. GeorgiaSenateApprovesBiliforNewFlag,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,2001, A12 (noting

that Georgia approved new flag that minimizes Confederate flag, which will fly on Feb. 1).
217. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging freedom of speech.).
218. The free speech guarantee applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
219. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,50 (1988).
220. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 153 (1996) ("A

democratic government derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is considered responsive to its
citizens .... We would rightly regard a government that treated its citizens as mereinstrumentalities

of the state--'closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses to communicate,'--as
totalitarian rather than democratic. ) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
221. See, e.g., FirstNat'l Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,785-86 (1978) ("Especially

where.., the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable
public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly
offended.").
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clause principle that the government may not selectively regulate private
speech "based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying
message." 2 It must instead tolerate "offensive" private speech m and
cannot favor
particular types of speech that it determines to be in the public
24
interest.
These protections against discriminatory regulation of private speech
outside the governmental domain extend also to instances in which the
government uses its property or resources to create a speech "forum. '' "2
"Forum doctrine" stems from the concept of the traditional public forum,
which includes government property such as streets, 227 parks,' and
sidewalks, 22 which have "by long tradition or by government fiat" been
"devoted to assembly and debate." Despite government ownership, the
objective characteristics of this property 23 -and thus its importance to the
Constitution's commitment to free expression - - "require the government
to accommodate private speakers.2 This required accommodation means
that, absent a compelling purpose, the government cannot discriminate

222. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,386 (1992).
223. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ('If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("'Tihe fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it.'); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,592 (1969) ('It is firmly
settled that.., the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.").
224. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("[U]nder the Equal
Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use
of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views.").
225. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)
(using a "'forum based' approach" to "[assess] restrictions that the government seeks to place on
the use of its property').
226. See id. at 678 (employing a "'forum based' approach').
(noting that "streets and parks" are traditional public forums) (quoting Hague v.
227. See id.
Comm'n for Indus Org., 307 U.S. 496,515 (1939)); Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474,481 (1988)
(holding residential street to be public forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37,45 (1983) (listing "streets and parks" as examples of traditional public forums).
228. PerryEduc.Ass'n, 460 U.S. at45; Capitol SquareReview & AdvisoryBd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (park area surrounding state capitol building).
229. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,318 (1988) (sidewalk outside embassy); United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (sidewalk outside Supreme Court building).
230. PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
231. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,677 (1998) ('Traditional public
fora are defined by the objective characteristics of the property.").
232. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrONAL LAW § 12-24 (2d ed. 1988) ("lhe
designation 'public forum' serves as shorthand for the recognition that a particular context
represents an important channel of communication in the system of free expression.").
233. Forbes,523 U.S. at 678.
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among speakers seeking access according to the content of their
messages."'
Beyond traditional public forums, which exist regardless of government
intent,235 the government can, by granting access to private speakers,
transform its property into speech forums. 3 6 Although the government is
not required to provide such access or financial aid to private speakers,
when it chooses to do so the "forum" principles limit its discretion to pick
and choose among speakers. The government retains the most discretion
to choose among speakers in nonpublic forums.237 In such forums it does
not grant "general access," but rather "does no more than reserve eligibility

234. See, e.g., id. at 677 ("The government can exclude a speaker from a traditional public
forum 'only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion
is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest."') (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Deg. & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992) ("[R]egulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available for
public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny.").
235. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678 ("[Traditional public fora are open for expressive activity
regardless of the government's intent.").
236. Id.(stating that the government creates a speech forum when it makes access to
government property or funding available "to a certain class of speakers").
237. Beyond the traditional public forurmhe Court has identified two other types of forums:
"mhe public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum." Id. at 677
(quoting Cornelius,473 U.S. at 802). The Court distinguishes the two by whether the government
grants "general" or "selective" access to private speakers. Id. at 679. Where the government "makes
its property generally available to a certain class of speakers," it creates a designated public forum.
Id. When the government then "excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated
public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny." Id. at 677. By
contrast, when the government grants "selective access" to its property, it creates a nonpublic
forum. Id. at 679. In a nonpublic forum, the exclusion of a speaker "must not be based on the
speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property." Id.
at 682. Although these rules appear different, they are really the same. The Court has held that the
government may "limit" a designated public forum according to criteria that are not viewpointbased. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 n.7 (1983). So, the
only real constraint on the government's ability to "designate" a "forum" is the same that applies
when it grants access to a nonpublic forum-it cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination. Justice
Blackmun recognized this early on. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 825-27 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
More recently, the Court has implicitly recognized this lack of distinction. See Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (characterizing funding mechanism
as a limited public forum, but applying rules of the nonpublic forum-exclusions must be
"reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum" and may not discriminate against speech
on the basis of its viewpoint) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806). Lower courts have done so
explicitly. See Gentala v. City of Tuscan, 213 F. 3d 1055, 1062 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[IThe
distinction between a limited public forum and a nonpublic forum is a semantic distinction without
an analytic difference."); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965
(9th Cir. 1999) (characterizing the Supreme Court's terminology as "us[ing] the term 'limited
public forum' to refer to atype ofnonpublic forum"); Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 194
n.8 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (agreeing with Justice Blackmun's observation in Corneliusthat the
'limited public forum [is] analytically indistinct from a nonpublic forum").
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for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members
must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to use it." 8 Still, forum
doctrine limits the grounds for permission decisions in such nonpublic
forums.2 39 The government can be "selective" according to a speaker's
topic or status. 240It cannot, however, discriminate among speakers for the
purpose of favoring or suppressing a particular point of view.2 4'
This prohibition on government viewpoint discrimination is so strong
that it exists even in circumstances where the government aids private
speakers in a context that may not be a forum at all. 2 According to the
Court, "even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not 'ai[m]
at the suppression of dangerous ideas." 3 Thus, in the context of a "highly
selective grant program, ' ' 244 in which "absolute neutrality is simply
'inconceivable,""'24 the Constitution would likely still forbid the
government "to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of
subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints. '4 6
C. Specialty Plate Programsand the Problem of Placement
Specialty plate programs do not fit well within either the "government
speech" or "private speech forum" categories, both because of the
differences among programs and the different aspects within particular
programs. As to the differences among programs, it is first necessary to

238. Forbes,523 U.S. at 679.
239. See id.at 682 ("[N]onpublic forum status 'does not mean that the government can restrict
speech in whatever way it likes."') (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 682 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
240. See, e.g., id. at 682 (holding that government may exclude candidate from debate
"because he had generated no appreciable public interest"); Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829 ('"he
necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may
justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics."); Perry
Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49 (holding that exclusion of speaker "based on status" is permissible).
241. See, e.g., Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682. "The government can restrict access to a nonpublic
forum 'as long as the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."' Id. at 677-78 (quoting Cornelius,473
U.S. at 800).
242. Id. at 677 (stating that, beyond traditional and designated public forums, "[o]ther
government properties are either nonpublic fora or not fora at all").
243. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v.
Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
244. Id. at 585 ("[I]t would be 'impossible to have a highly selective grant program without
denying money to a large amount of constitutionally protected expression."') (quoting Finley v.
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 685 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd 524 U.S. 569 (1998)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)).
245. Id. at 585-86 (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792,795-96 (1st Cir.
1976)).
246. Id. at 587 (stating that if the National Endowment for Arts were to do this, "then we
would confront a different case").
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distinguish programs under which the legislature approves applications
from those under which an administrative agency makes the decisions. It
is the former that are at issue in the current specialty plate challenges. The
latter was at issue in the one decision that has become final.2
The less common situation-where a state agency approves specialty
plate applications pursuant to legislative guidelines-is the easier one to
classify under the existing framework. In such a program, the legislature,
by establishing the program and setting out guidelines for applications,
evinces an intent to open a particular piece of government property for
private speech." The program created is thus properly classified as a
forum. 9 Because the area available on a license plate has certainly not
traditionally been available for private speech, the program creates a
nonpublic forum.m Under the existing framework, the question then
becomes whether the access rules-both those mandated by the legislature
and those imposed2by
the agency-are reasonable in light of the forum and
5
neutral.
viewpoint
The more common situation-where the legislature establishes a
specialty license plate program and retains for itself the discretion to
approve particular applications-is harder to classify. On the one hand,
application criteria are typically undefined by subject matter or viewpoint
and invite the participation of private speakers. These features suggest that
the legislature has created a private speech forum. On the other hand, the
current controversies illustrate quite clearly that legislative approval of
particular applications depends not only on meeting the ministerial
application requirements, but also on presenting a message that the
legislature deems substantively appropriate. This substantive review,
pursuant to which the legislators act as legislators, "pushing" particular
applications quickly through the process21 while "killing" others2 3 and
247. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (D. Md.

1997).
248. See id. (noting that statute allows Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration to issue
specialty plates to "qualifying" non-profit organizations, and that these qualifications include that
at least twenty-five members of the organization agree to pay the extra fee for the plates).
249. Il at 1102-03 (assuming that the specialty license plate program is a forum, but not
deciding which type because the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination applies to them all).
250. See supra note 237 (noting that there is no analytical difference between a limited and
a nonpublic forum).
251. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1102 ("[C]ontrol over.., a nonpublic forum [must be]
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and viewpoint neutral.") (quoting Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,806 (1985)).
252. See, e.g., Belkin, supranote 98, atA15 (noting that executive vice president of Indiana's

Right To life organization said, after "Choose Life" plate bill stalled, that "he would attempt to
push the bill through again").
253. Id. ('In Indiana, the [Choose Life] plate was attached to a bill approving veterans of
foreign wars plates but was killed when plates supporting the AFL-CIO and United Auto Workers
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openly relying on majority preferences for approving or rejecting particular
applications, suggests that the government is doing more than neutrally
managing a private speech forum. The degree of government involvement
in the selection process suggests that the government itself is talking.
In addition to the objective features of the specialty plate programs,
government officials' explanations and arguments in defense of the
programs evidence confusion as to whether the programs constitute private
or public expression. According to one Louisiana legislator, the "Choose
Life" specialty plate is "no different from a bumper sticker." 4 The wide
range of specialty plates available may indicate that the plate is not a "state
endorsement of any certain viewpoint." 255 While the assistant state attorney
general, arguing on behalf of the state in the legal challenge, agreed that
the availability of bumper stickers was relevant to the constitutional
inquiry, his point was that such "alternative methods" for private speakers
to express their views meant that the specialty plate program did not create
a "forum for private speech." 2 6
In Florida, Governor Lawton Chiles vetoed the "Choose Life" plate bill
when it was first passed, stating that "[s]imply because a particular
message is able to garner a majority of votes in the Florida Legislature"
does not mean that it should appear on "an official State of Florida license
plate." ' When the bill was later passed again and signed into law by
Governor Jeb Bush, the state argued that the plate was appropriate
specifically because its sponsors "had the votes."25B In Virginia, the one
black legislator who voted in favor of the Confederate flag plates in
committee explained that his vote was based on his fear that "the state
might be sued for discrimination if the request was denied." 9 Another
black legislator, however, through a "spellbinding speech about racism,"
successfully
convinced the House of Delegates to excise the flag logo from
26
the plate. 0
The characterization of the specialty plate programs by different states
andjudges has varied, too. Florida successfully convinced a federal district

were added to the bill, said RogerTennyson, the executive vice president of Indiana's RightTo Life
organization."); Humphrey, supranote 189, at A3 (stating that Tennessee Confederate flag plate
bill "was killed in the House Calendar Committee after several black legislators objected to the idea
of the state sanctioning a plate featuring a Confederate flag").

254. Ritea, supra note 106, at Al (comment of Rep. Melinda Schwegmann).
255. Id. ("Louisianahas 104 specialty plates-labeled with everythingfrom 'PreservetheWild
Turkey' to 'Louisiana State University.'").
256. Gyan, supra note 115, at lB.
257. ACLU Press Release, supranote 64.
258. Talkback Live, supra note 65 (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education
Commissioner).
259. Jackson, supra note 168, at Al.

260. Heyser & Knepler, supranote 175, at A16.
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court judge to dismiss the plaintiffs' challenge as not ripe, based on
plaintiffs' failure to apply for a pro-choice license plate. 1 The court also
found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the bill creating the
"Choose Life" plate because the wide variety of specialty plates available
means that "in no way does [the "Choose Life" plate] prevent anyone's
speech."2 2 Both of these reasons implicitly characterize Florida's specialty
plate program as a forum. By contrast, in Virginia the state argued that the
specialty plate program does not create a forum, but is a form of
government speech. 63 The court, however, characterized the specialty
plate program as a forum.2" In Louisiana, the federal district court
accepted the state's argument that the "Choose Life" plate "articulat[es] a
viewpoint legislatively chosen and embraced by the State," 5 but used that
finding to determine that "the State fails in its responsibility to provide a
viewpoint-neutral forum."2"
IV. LEGISLATION AND THE LIMITS OF "SELECTIVrrY" AMONG
PRIVATE SPEAKERS

The crucial question that the distinction between government speech
and private speech forums addresses is the degree of selectivity that the
government can exercise when granting aid, in the form of property access
or funding, to private speakers. Specifically, a government can
discriminate according to viewpoint in its own speech, whereas it cannot
do so when it chooses among private speakers. Because the distinctions
drawn in the approval process are either openly267 or very likely viewpointbased,' s characterization of the programs is crucial to their
constitutionality.

261. Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-1-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at*14-20
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22,1999).
262. Id. at *20.
263. Bowman, supra note 183, at B8.
264. SCV v. Holcomb, No. 7:99CV00530, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 538, at *23.
265. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589,596 (E.D. La. 2000).
266. Id. at 599.
267. Government decision makers acknowledge that they denied license plate access to the
Confederate flag logo becauseofits"hostileand raciallyderogatory" message. Sons ofConfederate
Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (D. Md. 1997). Message-based
discrimination is viewpoint discrimination. See R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391
(1992).
268. It is less clear why the "ChooseLife" plates were approved than why the Confederate flag
plates were denied. In Louisiana, the government argued that it approves of the message.
Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 595. In Florida, challengers argued that an attempt to get an
alternative messageonaplate would be "fruitless." Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CW-J-21-A,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *17 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999). The legislative process at least
leaves wide discretion for viewpoint discrimination to operate.
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The specialty license plate programs at issue present both sides of this
selectivity question. One claim is that specialty license plate programs are
forms of government speech. In this case, the government would have
broad discretion to be selective among private applicants. Obviously, it is
advantageous for a government that wants to be selective to claim private
speech as its own. The question is whether and when the Constitution
limits the government's ability to do this.
If government cannot effectively claim the protections of government
speech for specialty plate programs, then they are private speech forums.
In such forums, limits on the government's selectivity apply. The question
then is whether the existing programs located in the legislature do, or can,
meet the Constitution's viewpoint neutrality requirement.

A. Specialty License PlateProgramsas "Not a Forum atAll"
Not all government property on which private speakers can speak
constitutes a forum. Some government aid, in the form of access or
funding, does not constitute a "for[urn] at all."' 9 Where the government
does not create a forum, it can be more selective in choosing the recipients
of its largesse. 2 ° In a number of recent cases, the Supreme Court has
upheld government selectivity among private speakers beyond the
boundaries of the forum restrictions. 2 ' It is thus necessary to determine the
boundaries of these categories where greater selectivity is permissible and
to determine whether the specialty plate programs at issue fit within them.
1. Government Agents
To the extent that "government" can speak, it must be able to speak
through agents.' : Government officials are government agents, 73 as are
government bodies. 4 Beyond government employees and entities, the

269. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,677 (1998).
270. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,587-88 (1998) ("The
Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible
were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake.").
271. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88 ("[The Government may allocate competitive funding
according to criteria that would be impernissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal
penalty at stake."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (stating that government may
"selectively fund" speech of government agents); Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 (noting that
government's exercise of "editorial discretion" is not subject to restrictions of forum doctrine).
272. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 204, at 702 ("Because 'government' as such cannot speak, the
only way it can express its views is by paying human beings to do so.").
273. Bd. of Regents of Univ. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,235 (2000) ("[E]Iected
officials ... espouse [the government's] position.').
274. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,833 (1995) (stating that
when "the University is speaking," it has the discretion of the government to "make content-based
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government may "[enlist] private entities to convey its own message."
Like "government" generally, these agents must be able to choose among
viewpoints to explain and advocate the "government's" position.276
Because their speech is traceable to the government, its legitimacy depends
upon the political accountability that supports government speech and
justifies viewpoint discrimination within it.2'
The Supreme Court condoned government control of its private agents'
speech in Rust v. Sullivan. 8 That case involved a challenge to Department
of Health and Human Services regulations implementing Title X of the
Public Health Service Act.279 The Act authorized the Department to fund
"preventive"' family planning services, meaning that those where
"abortion is a method of family planning" are excluded. 28 ' The
Department's regulations prohibited Title X grantees from providing
"counseling . .. or... referral for abortion"'' and from engaging in
activities that "encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of
family planning."' Plaintiffs, Title X grantee organizations and doctors
suing on behalf of themselves and their patients, argued that the
regulations "impermissibly discriminat[ed] based on viewpoint" by
favoring private speakers who advocated childbirth over those who
advocated abortion.'
The Court responded that Title X grantees were government agents
during the time that they worked under the auspices of the project. 285 As
such, the government could appropriately prohibit them "from engaging in
activities outside of the project's scope." Such a prohibition was "not a

choices").
275. Id.
276. Id. ("When the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a
governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.").
277. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 ("When the government speaks [as an organizational body
or through its agents], for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is,
in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy.").
278. 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991).
279. Id. at 178.
280. Id. at 178-79 (stating that abortion exclusion "was intended to ensure that Title X funds
would 'be used only to support preventive family planning services, population research, infertility
services, and otherrelated medical, informational, and educational activities") (quoting H.R. CONF.
REP.No. 91-1667, at 8 (1970), reprintedin1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068,5081-82).
281. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1991)).
282. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989)).
283. Id.
at 180 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989)).
284. Id. at 194.
285. Id. at 198.
286. Id. at 194.
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case of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous idea,"' 7 but rather was
akin to its funding a National Endowment for Democracy, which Congress
could constitutionally require to promote one political philosophy over
others. 2
Not everyone aided by the government to speak, however, is a
government agent. The public forum cases,2 9 and particularly the
extension of the public forum doctrine into "funding forums," 2 ' confirm
this. The mere fact that the government provides property access or

financial assistance to private speakers is not enough to justify government

viewpoint discrimination among them.291 It is thus necessary to identify
what additional factors make a private speaker a government agent.
Because political accountability is what justifies viewpoint
discrimination by government agents, it is crucial that the government
acknowledge a government agent's speech as its own. 292 Whether the
acknowledgment in Rust was sufficient is questionable, given the common
expectation by patients entering medical clinics that the speech of doctors
in the clinics is not subject to government control. 9 Nevertheless, the
democratic pedigree and public visibility of the statutory directive, and the
294
doctors' ability to make clear that their speech is government-controlled,

287. Id.
288. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. § 4411(b) (1989)).
289. Id: at 199-200 ("Mhe existence ofaGovemnment 'subsidy,' in the form of Governmentowned property, does not justify the restriction of speech in [traditional public forums].').
290. Bd. of Regents of Univ. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth,529 U.S. 217,233-35 (2000) ("When
a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students,
all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others.... Our decision
ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University, its agents or employees, orof particular importance-its faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis which controls
in this case"); Rosenbergerv. Rector &Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,841 (1995) (finding
that school's adherence to a rule of viewpoint neutrality in administering its student fee program
to fund student speech would prevent "any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak
for the University").
291. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199-200 ('lisis not to suggest that funding by the Government, even
when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the
Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content
of expression.").
292. See Southworth,529 U.S. at 229 ("The University having disclaimed that the speech is
its own, we do not reach the question whether traditional political controls to ensure responsible
government action would be sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections and to allow the
challenged program under the principle that the government can speak for itself.').
293. See Post, supra note 220, at 174 & n.128 (distinguishing situation in Rust "where
physicians routinelyexercise independentjudgment, [and so] patients come to expect and relyupon
that judgment" from alternate scenario of government-created "special clinics in which all
concerned were clear that what appeared at first blush to be 'physicians' were actually merely state
employees, fully subject to [government control of their speech]").
294. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 ('The doctor is always free to make clear that advice regarding
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are at least arguably sufficient for the government to claim funded doctors'
speech as its own.
But a mere claim by the government that particular private speech is its
own cannot be enough.295 The claim must be plausible in the context of the
entire access or funding program. 2" The government's policy and practice
of administering access to the subsidy is relevant,2 as is the public's
perception of the public or private nature of the expression.29 Within a
particular program, the government cannot pick and choose among
speakers to call its agents. 2' The claim must be uniform throughout the
subsidy program.' ° Moreover, a government agent' must be pursuing a
particular government policy identified within the scope of the authorized
program."' Although the government policy can be speech-related, so as
to explain or promote particular behavior or values.' it cannot be so
broadly defined that it boils down to a policy to promote a range of private
expression. A specialty license plate program is a government decision to
create a private speech forum, not to promote speech by government
agents. 3
abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program ").
295. In the forum inquiry, the Court looks beyond the government's assertion of a right to
choose among private speakers to determine whether, given the characteristics of the forum, it in
fact has the right to do so. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,682
(1998) (stating that television commissioner did not have "unfettered power to exclude any
candidate it wished").
296. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(examining "the lawful boundaries" to a funding program that the government "has itself set").
297. See Forbes,523 U.S. at 677 ("The Court has looked to the policy and practice of the
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly
and debate as a public forum.") (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788,802 (1985)); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1,
10 (1 st Cir. 1994) ("mhe Court also has stated that the government's intent must be gleaned from
its policy and practice with respect to the property at issue."); see also Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc.
v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 5,941 F.2d 45, 47 (lst Cir. 1991) (stating that, in forum designation
inquiry, "actual practice speaks louder than words').
298. Forbes,523 U.S. at 675 (characterizing candidate debate as private speech forum in part
because of "implicit representation of the broadcaster... that the views expressed were those of
the candidates [and] not its own").
299. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 833-34 (finding that, when the government "create[s] a
program to encourage private speech," it cannot "discriminate based on the viewpoint of the private
persons whose speech it facilitates").
300. See id.at 833 (noting that the government in Rust "used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own programs").
301. Id. ("We recognized [in Rust] that when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.').
302. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991) ("[G]overnment may 'make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and.., implement that judgment by the allocation of
public funds."') (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)).
303. See Forbes,523 U.S. at 675 (finding that candidate debate was a private speech forum
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The factors noted above indicate that neither the groups that obtain the
right to specialty plate recognition nor the individuals who purchase the
plates are government agents. Specialty plate programs broadly invite
applications from any group able to gather enough public support to
suggest that the proposed plate would be profitable. 3°4 The plates are
generally understood by purchasers and viewers to be private speech."°
The inconsistent groups and messages on the plates in any particular state
defy an attempt by state governments to claim all specialty plate speech as
their own. Consequently, the only government policy that officials can
claim to be pursuing is allowing private speakers with identities or
messages consistent with public values to advertise those values with
public assistance.3 7 Such a broad designation of government policy is not
a legitimate government agent designation.
2. Government Editorial Judgments
The government also avoids the viewpoint discrimination restrictions
of forum doctrine when it exercises editorial discretion. Although the
government action "involve[s] the compilation of the speech of third
parties, the decisions nonetheless constitute communicative acts." 3 8
Because the decisions of the governmental editors are themselves speech,
claims of viewpoint discrimination are inconsistent with their very
nature.30 9 Specifically in the context of public broadcasters, "[t]o comply
with their obligation to air programming that serves the public interest,
broadcasters must often choose among speakers expressing different
viewpoints. 310 While some editors may abuse the power to discriminate
because "[t]he very purpose of the debate was to allow the candidates to express their views with
minimal intrusion by the broadcaster").
304. See, e.g., Talkback Live, supra note 65 ("(A] legislator has the right to put in a bill to
have any kind ofatag they want as long as they get the signatures required and put up the deposit.")
(statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner).
305. See, e.g., Ritea, supra note 106, at Al ("We have license plates that support animals,
universities, Ducks Unlimited and I don't know what all.... It simply means if someone believes
in a cause, they're willing to pay the money for the license plates.") (quoting Rep. Melinda
Schweginann).
306. See, e.g., Talkback Live, supra note 65 ("Some people might think that the Florida State
University tag and the University of Florida tag could be pretty political, because when they plat
[sic] that game which they played a couple of weeks ago, it became pretty political.") (statement
of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner).
307. Lee, supra note 48, at 15A ("[Tihe Legislature has, by statute, given the citizens of
Florida the right to petition the state for a license plate.... Additionally, the Senate has imposed
nine policy questions to ensure that the license plate serves a broad public purpose.").
308. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674.
309. Id. ("[A] broadcaster by its nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints
instead of others.").
310. Id.
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among viewpoints, "calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve
higher values."3"' Chief among these values is the exercise of the "widest
journalistic freedom."3 12 A threat to this value is "the risk of an
enlargement of Government control over the content of broadcast
discussion of public issues," were equal access rules to apply. 3 Making
courts the arbiters of such equal access claims "could obstruct the
legitimate purposes of television broadcasters," which is to determine "the
treatment of public issues" and to remain "accountable" for their
choices.314
Specialty license plate programs are not unified government speech acts
such as a public broadcaster's programming,3 '5 a government entity's
3
report or newsletter, 31 6 or even a government-sponsored paradeO--to
which the protections of editorial discretion might appropriately apply. In
each of these instances, rather than consisting "of individual, unrelated
segments that happen to be transmitted together for individual selection by
[private individuals]," each individual unit of communication "is
understood to contribute something to a common theme. ' 318 By contrast,
legislators generally do not view themselves as "editors" when they
approve the particular "mix" of specialty license plates available for
purchase,31 9 and members of the public, while perhaps objecting to a

311. Id. (quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973)).
312. Id.
313. CBS, 412 U.S. at 125.
314. Forbes,523 U.S. at 674-75 (citing CBS, 412 U.S. at 124).
315. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512U.S. 622,636 (1994) (Through 'original programming
or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire,'
cable programmers and operators 'seek to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and
in a wide variety of formats.") (quoting City of LA. v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S.
488,494 (1986)).
316. Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (holding that
newsletter whose "contents range from energy-saving tips to stories about wildlife conservation,
and from billing information to recipes ... receives the full protection of the First Amendment!).
317. Cf.Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
577 (1995) ("[Iln the context of an expressive parade, as with a protest march, the parade's overall
message is distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit's expression is
perceived by spectators as part of the whole.").
318. Id. at 576 (explaining why private parade cannot be forced to accept unwanted marching
unit).
319. Ritea, supra note 106, at Al ("We have license plates that support animals, universities,
Ducks Unlimited and Idon't know what all. It simply means if someonebelieves in acause, they're
willing to pay the money for the license plates.") (quoting Rep. Melinda Schwegmann); Talkback
Live, supra note 65 ("[W]hen we did the Cabinet meeting the other day, we did [a specialty plate]
for bicyclists. You have one for salt water fishermen. And so there's a variety, about 48 different
organizations, including the Challenger, that basically are there to raise money for different
organizations and different things.") (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education
Commissioner).
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particular plate's message, do not understand the compilation of plates
approved to express an overall "message" or "theme." 320 Rather, both
legislators and the public generally understand specialty plate programs to
make a range of plate messages available to private individuals who can
choose whether to purchase one, display it, and thereby claim it as their
own. Because specialty plates are primarily understood as separate acts of
individual expression rather than as a combined whole of government
expression, the "higher value" of protecting the government's editorial
discretion to pick and choose among plate applicants does not exist in this
context.
3. Competitive Quality Judgments
The constraints of forum doctrine do not apply with full force when the
government aids private speakers pursuant to a program established to
identify and promote "excellence." This "inherently content-based...
threshold" distinguishes the program from those where the Government
"indiscriminately 'encourage[s] a diversity of views from private
speakers."' 3 In the latter, a court can require that access criteria be
viewpoint-neutral,323whereas in the former "absolute neutrality is simply
'inconceivable."'
The Supreme Court approved potentially viewpoint-based criteria in the
context of a facial challenge to "highly selective" National Endowment for
the Arts (NEA) funding. 32 In National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley,'S the Court found that, because the Government was acting as
"patron" rather than as "sovereign," the free speech clause constraints on
its discretion were less stringent. 3' The Court emphasized that "[tihe
NEA's mandate to make aesthetic judgments" set its task apart from that

320. ACLU Press Release, supra note 64 (arguing that approval of "Choose Life" plate is
inappropriate because it concerns "the most divisive public issue in our state today," and is "quite

different from traditional specialty tags which support projects such as universities, the
environment, the arts, endangered species and education").
321. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (finding that

"excellence" threshold of National Endowment for the Arts "sets it apart" from noncompetitive
subsidies).
322. Id. (quotingRosenberger v. Rector &Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,834 (1995)).
323. Id. at 585 (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir.
1976)).
324. Id
325. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).

326. Id. at 587-89 ("[A]lthough the First Amendment has application in the subsidy context,
we note that the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be
impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake .... But when the
Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision [of
standards] are not constitutionally severe.").
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of other government actors charged with making "comparatively objective
decisions on allocating public benefits, such as access to a school
auditorium or a municipal theater, or [to] the second class mailing
privileges available to 'all newspapers and other periodical
publications."327
The question is how far the government's ability to make "quality" or
"excellence"-based judgments extends. In particular, the government's
primary argument for selecting among specialty plate messages is that it
has the right, and the obligation, to approve those plates that are consistent
with public values. 3" This "quality" measure mirrors the standard
approved in Finley. 29 Thus, its legitimacy depends upon whether specialty
plate programs can be characterized as the same sort of government-aspatron program approved in Finley.
Crucial to Finley'sapproval of such a quality judgments program is that
it has boundaries.3rO These boundaries distinguish such a program from a
private speech forum, where the rule against viewpoint discrimination
applies with full force.331 It is thus necessary to determine what these
boundaries are. That the government can discriminate more freely in
administering a quality judgments program suggests that, as with
government editorial judgments, "risks of abuse" are tolerated in order to
serve "higher values."332 In the context of government editorial judgments,
the primary higher values served are adding the unique voice of the
government editor to the marketplace of ideas,333 and thereby augmenting
327. Id. at 586 (quoting Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 148 n.1 (1946)) (citations

omitted).
328. See, e.g., Heyser& Knepler, supranote 175, at A16 ("[Legislator's] spellbinding speech
about racism compelled the House of Delegates to remove the Confederate flag from a proposed

license plate."); Lee, supra note 48, at 15A (stating that Senate's "nine policy questions... ensure
that the license plate serves a broad public purpose" and protects against approval of plates that
"advertise a negative fringe idea").
329. Finley, 524 U.S. at 576 (noting that statute directs NEA to "tak[e] into consideration

general standards ofdecency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public")
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1965)) (alteration in original).
330. The extent of the government's ability to engage in explicit viewpoint discrimination,
even in a quality judgments program, is unclear after Finley. Although approving the "decency and
respect" criteria for arts funding, the Court also mentioned as relevant to its decision that the
at 580, that the criteria were "hortatory" rather than
challenge was facial, rather than as applied, id.
mandatory, id., and that there was no evidence that the NEA would "leverage its power to award
subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints," id. at 587.
331. See id, at 586 (distinguishing NEA quality judgments program from the "limited public
forum" created by auniversity when it decides to subsidize the speech of"all student organizations
that [are] 'related to [its] educational purpose") (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995)).
332. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (quoting CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973)).
333. See id. at 675 (stating that "exercise ofjournalistic discretion"is "speech activity" with
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rather than constricting the speech available for public consumption.
Determining when these same values are served with respect to
government quality judgments marks the boundaries of this type of forum.
Government speech-alone or produced through interaction with
private individuals or entities-is a free speech clause value when the
prerequisites for legitimate government speech are met. The primary
prerequisite is government accountability for its role in shaping the speech
that enters the marketplace of ideas. 3M Accountability comes most
fundamentally from visibility.335 In the context of a quality judgments
program, this means that the government can claim the discretion that
attaches to it only when it acknowledges responsibility for making quality
judgments.336 A related requirement of accountability is the consistency of
the government's articulated intent with its practice.337 To claim the
discretion of a quality judgment program, the government must
acknowledge responsibility for making quality judgments with respect to
all of the private speakers subsidized by the program.
These requirements thus far, however, allow the government broad
leeway to articulate and apply a "consistent with public values" access rule
to almost any government-provided speech opportunity. This ability to
subvert the private speech forum neutral access rules suggests that
something more is required for the government to create and administer a
legitimate qualityjudgments forum.33" In Finley,the Court emphasized that
identifying and promoting "excellent" expression was the primary purpose
of the program3 39 and that the NEA held a "mandate" to make these

which courts should not interfere).
334. Id. at 675 ("[C]ontrol over the treatment of public issues" is properly situated with
"licensees who are accountable for broadcast performance") (quoting CBS, 412 U.S. at 124); see
also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,235 (2000) ("When the
it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for
government speaks ....
its advocacy.").
335. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1, 49 (2000)
("[Cilear identification of speech as the government's enhances accountability by permitting the
citizens to know what positions the government has taken and to reject them, if necessary, at
election time.').
336. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (finding that, where government is "responsible for
[speech's] content," the Court will evaluate it as government speech).
337. C.Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,829 (1995) ("Once
it has opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself
set.").
338. Md at 832 (rejecting university's argument that its "substantial discretion in determining
how to allocate scarce resources to accomplish its educational mission"justified choosing between
religious and nonreligious publications in allocating student publication funding).
339. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998) (noting that
establishment of NSA represents a "national policy of support for the... arts in the United States,"
and criteria for grants include "artistic and cultural significance" and "professional excellence")
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aesthetic judgments.' Rather than being idiosyncratic to the program
under review, these boundary-establishing elements are essential to the
legitimacy of a government quality judgments program.
The first requirement-that the government program be primarily
directed to promoting "excellent" expression-ensures accountability of
the government's decision to enter and influence the marketplace of ideas.
This means that the program must be established with a primary expressive
goal clearly visible. While in other free speech contexts, that the
government aims only incidentally at speech helps to validate its action,"
the opposite is true when the government seeks to enter the speech market.
"Incidental" quality-based speech judgments pose the great danger that
they may be made unaccountably.
The second requirement-that a government entity have a "mandate"
to make quality-based judgments--ensures accountability of the decision
to vest the responsibility for making quality-based judgments in a
particular entity. The visibility of the vestiture helps to ensure that the
entity charged with making the quality judgments has some expertise to do
so. That the entity has particular expertise reduces the risk of abuse of the
discretion to discriminate.
Moreover, the Court emphasized in Finley that the NEA grants were
not only "selective," but were also "competitive.,' 342 Scarcity alone does
not justify discrimination that may be viewpoint-related.' 3 Because of the
purpose of the program, the need to make competitive decisions among
applicants does justify such discrimination.' "Competitive" decisions in
the context of a quality judgments program mean that qualified applicants
are selected from a significantly larger pool.' This type of competitive
selection process is essential to the legitimacy of a quality judgments
program for several reasons. One is that such competitive decisions are
necessary to ensure the prestige, and thus credibility, of the "excellent"

(quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 953(b), 954(c)(1) (1965)).
340. Il at 586.
341. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that incidental

restriction of speech is subject to less demanding review than government action aimed at speech
directly).
342. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 ("The 'very assumption' of the NEA is that grants will be
awarded according to the 'artistic worth of competing applicants...."') (quoting Advocates for the
Arts v. Thomson 532 F.2d 792, 795 (lst Cir. 1976).
343. Rosenberger,515 U.S. at835 ("hegovemmentcannotjustifyviewpointdiscrininaion
among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity.').
344. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88 ("[TIhe Government may allocate competitive funding
according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal
penalty at stake.").
345. Id. at 585 ("e NEA has limited resources, and it must deny the majority of the grant
applications that it receives, including many that propose 'artistically excellent' projects.").
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designation. If the government is to be able to claim the discretion of a
speaker in making its quality based judgments, it must do more than rubber
stamp applications. Its voice must make a meaningful statement. That a
program is competitive in this way also provides a crucial political process
guarantee against the risk of invidious viewpoint discrimination. That
many do not receive the benefit helps ensure accountability of quality
decisions because the disadvantaged group includes politically powerful
sources.34 6 Where only a few are "selected out" the great danger exists that
purported "quality"-based judgments mask viewpoint discrimination in
what is otherwise an open forum.
Finally, another factor that supported the government-as-patron
designation in Finley was that the government was spending money. 47 In
other contexts, the government's spending of money justifies
discrimination among recipients that would violate the Constitution if done
in the context of regulation.' In addition, accountability may be
heightened when the government spends money because funds are a
limited resource, and so decisions about how to spend them are highly
visible3 9 Although not dispositive when it is present, the factor of
government spending is quite important when it is absent; for example,
when the government program makes money rather than spends it. Not
only does the lack of government spending make discrimination less
visible, it also suggests that promoting "excellent" expression is not really
the government's primary goal. 5°
These factors indicate that specialty license plate programs do not
constitute legitimate quality judgments programs where "risky"

346. Cf.Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,112-13 (1949) ("[There] is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the

principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political

retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.").
347. Finley, 524 U.S. at 588 ("Congress has wide latitude to set spending priorities.").
348. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (stating that

subsidy out of state's general fund can favor in-state residents); South-Central Timber Dee., Inc.
v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1984) (stating that, where state acts as market participant, it can
favor its own residents).

349. See Healy, 512 U.S. at 211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting, but not relying upon, a
possible "important economic reality: A State is less likely to maintain a subsidy when its citizens
perceive that the money (in the geneal fund) is available for any number of competing,
nonprotectionist, purposes").
350. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,682 (1992) (stating
that status of airports as "commercial establishments funded by users fees and designed to make a
regulated profit" and their need to "provide services attractive to the marketplace" means that "it
cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has as a principal purpose promoting 'the free
exchange of ideas"').
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government discretion is justified by "higher values. ' 5 ' First, although
some governments claim responsibility for some quality judgments about
the content of specialty plates, they arguably do not claim responsibility for
all. Second, even if the programs are viewed as generally granting access
to plates "consistent with public values," the accountability guarantees are
not met. Specialty plate programs do not state a primary purpose to
promote "quality" expression. Third, to the extent that they state a
"consistent with public values" purpose, decisionmaking authority is
vested in the legislature, which has no particular expertise to determine
what constitutes "excellent" expression. Fourth, and quite importantly,
specialty plate programs "select out" rather than "select in," creating the
great danger of viewpoint discrimination. Finally, through these programs
the governments make money rather than spend it. The accountability that
attaches to government spending programs thus does not apply. For all of
these reasons, specialty license plate programs do not constitute legitimate
quality judgments programs where relaxed Free Speech Clause restraints
apply.
B. Specialty License PlateProgramsas Private Speech Forums
The more obvious characterization of specialty license plate programs
is as private speech forums. While the speech occurs on a governmentissued identifying mechanism and is limited by the space made available,
its content is both advertised by the government and understood by the
public as privately uttered. The wide range of plates made available and
the fact that messages may contradict each other further confirm that the
government has opened a previously unavailable speech opportunity to a
class of private speakers. Courts reviewing the programs have
characterized them as private speech forums. 5 2 If the specialty license
plate programs are private speech forums, then "selectivity" limits apply.

351. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 583-84 (rejecting as "unlikely" respondents' claim that the NEA
criteria "are sufficiently subjective that the agency could utilize them to engage in viewpoint
discrimination"); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,674 (1998) (noting that
"risks of abuse" are tolerated to preserve "value" of editorial discretion).
352. Sons ofConfederateVeterans, Inc. v. Holcomb,CaseNo. 7:99CV00530, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 538, at *5-13; Henderson v. Stalder, 112F. Supp. 2d 589,596 (E.D. La. 2000) (rejecting

state's argument that specialty plate program does not create a forum for speech); Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099,1102 (D. Md. 1997) (applying forum
rule of viewpoint neutrality without deciding the type of forum). But seeHiggins v. Driver& Motor
Vehicles Serv. Branch, 170 Ore. App. 542,2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 1751 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (en
banc) ('We believe that the proper course is to view the communication that occurs on state license
plates, including, custom [vanity] plates, as state communication rather than as communication by
the plate holders or a combination of both.").
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1. Viewpoint Discrimination
In administering a private speech forum, the government may not
discriminate according to viewpoint. The government does this when it
permits speakers with some, but not all, viewpoints on a particular topic
access to the forum. 5 3 Viewpoint neutral grounds for exclusion may relate
to a speaker's popularity; for example, defining a "class" of speakers
according to their elected or potentially electable status. 31 It is not
permissible, however, for the government to evaluate viewpoints
apart
355
from the status or subject matter definitions of the forum.

The current specialty license plate controversies present different
viewpoint discrimination dangers. As one court has already held, denying
specialty plate access to the SCV logo because of the Confederate flag's
message is viewpoint discrimination.356 That state officials reacted to
public opposition does not change this determination. 35 7 Thus, with respect
to the Confederate flag plate, the governments' defenses of their specialty
plate programs depend upon characterizing them as something other than
private speech forums.
The "Choose Life" specialty plate controversies, at least in the states
that have approved the plate,3 5 ' do not so clearly demonstrate viewpoint
discrimination. While legislators acknowledge that they approved the plate
because they approved of its message, in none of these states has a plate
with a competing viewpoint been proposed and denied.359 The wide range
of plates available can support an inference of viewpoint neutrality,

353. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
354. Forbes,523 U.S. at 682 (finding that candidate was properly excluded from debate "not
because of his viewpoint but because he had generated no appreciable publicinterese'); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (finding that rival union was
properly excluded "based on the status" of not being the employees' elected representative).
355. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832 (finding that it was impermissible to deny funding to

otherwise qualified student group because of its "religious perspective").
356. Glendening,954 F. Supp. at 1103-04 (stating thatviewpoint discrimination in Maryland's
SCV plate recall was "plain beyond dispute").

357. Id. at 1104 ("A desire to stem listeners' reactions to speech is simply not a viewpointneutral basis for regulation.').
358. Even where state legislatures have refused to approve the "Choose Life" plate, their
reasons less clearly demonstrate viewpoint discrimination than in states denying plate access to the
Confederate flag. See Talkback Live, supranote 65 (stating that Virginia proposal changed from
"Choose Life" to "Choose Adoption," then stalled when the Senate Committee wanted to change
the word "Choose" as well).
359. See Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589,600 (E.D. La. 2000) (noting, but rejecting
as defeating justiciability, defendants' argument that "plaintiffs have not alleged that they have
actually gone through the process of obtaining a prestige plate"); Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99583-CIV-J-2 l-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *21 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22,1999) ("SincePlaintiffs
have failed to even apply for the development of a specialty license plate which espouses their
views under the Florida speciality [sic] plate statutory scheme, their claim is not ripe.").
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making it dubious to determine that the decision to approve a particular
plate constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 3 ° So, with respect to the
"Choose Life" plate, a government's defense of its specialty plate program
as a private speech forum is facially plausible until the legislature denies
approval to a plate with a competing point of view.
Even when the administration of specialty plate programs is facially
plausible because of lack of evidence of viewpoint discrimination in
approval or disapproval decisions, the question remains whether the
program's structure meets the requirements of the Constitution. In
particular, the lack of evidence with respect to the grounds for approval
and disapproval decisions stems from the wide discretion that the
legislature has to craft the law as coalitions of legislators see fit. The basic
question that must be addressed with respect to all of the specialty license
plate programs at issue is whether the Constitution permits the legislature
to create and administer a private speech forum.
2. The Separation of Powers Limit on a Legislature's
Administration of a Private Speech Forum
The question at the heart of the specialty plate controversies is the
government's discretion to be "selective" in granting speech opportunities
to private speakers. That a specialty plate program is characterized as a
private speech forum means that constitutional limits on the government's
ability to be selective in choosing among private speakers apply. Courts
usually enforce these selectivity limits against the executive officials who
administer most private speech forums, requiring clear access standards'
and uniform application of them.3" This is a familiar form of judicial
review. Where the forum administrator is the legislature, however, such
review is more problematic. Specifically, requiring guidelines, reasons and

360. See Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *21 ("IThe statute approving the"Choose
Life" plate] grants an opportunity for speech, but in no way does it prevent anyone's speech. No
one is forced to carry the Choose Life license plate on his car. Florida motorists currently have
thirty (30) other specialty plates and two (2) other regular license plates to choose from."). But see

Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 601 ("By the very act of injecting 'the State's position which has
been legislatively sanctioned' into a forum, First Amendment injury occurs.").
361. See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 12
(lst Cir. 1994) (finding transit authority's access policy so "vague and broad" that it leads to an
unconstitutional"appearance ofviewpoint discrimination"inits application); Air Line Pilots Assn.,,
Int'l v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1154 n.5 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "taste
and morality [are] standards too vague to be enforced" in administering a private speech forum).
362. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,803-04(1985)

(looking at both "practice" and "policy" to determine nature of private speech forum); Air Line
Pilots,45 F.3d at 1153 (stating that"factual inquiry into consistent policy and practice is necessary"
to determine boundaries of a private speech forum).
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uniformity with respect to pieces of legislation is in dramatic tension with
the legislature's constitutionally mandated range of discretion.
Legislation is the most "selective" of government activities. Legislators
can constitutionally vote for or against proposed legislation for good
reason, poor reason or no reason at all63 They are answerable to their
constituents for their individual votes rather than to heightened
constitutional standards of equal treatment. 3" Legislators have this
discretion because the political process protections of the Constitution are
the primary guarantee of the fairness of the policy-based decision. 3" The
political process protections are sufficient because the government's
actions are visible, and so the government actors responsible are
accountable for their decisions.?
By contrast, the Constitution's forum rules limit the government's
ability to be "selective" as to the speakers who can gain access to the
public property at issue. Most fundamentally, the Constitution imposes the
equal treatment standard of viewpoint neutrality on the government when
it chooses among private speakers. This standard applies because, in the
context of making individual speech selection decisions, the political
process is an inadequate constitutional protection. In fact, not only is it
inadequate, it is constitutionally perverse. The free speech guarantee
protects
minority speech, while the political process reflects majority
3 67

will.

The fundamental inconsistency of legislative selectivity and the limits
of selectivity in a private speech forum indicate that the legislature cannot
constitutionally run one. The ability, and perhaps obligation, of legislators
to pass on individual applications as they pass on other pieces of
that is, to act according to "the . . . electorate's
legislation -

363. Politics,T-mADvOCATE, Mar. 29,1998, at 1B (describingsenatorwho said thatalthough
"he normally votes against special license plates," he will vote in favor of the Girl Scouts'

application because "I can't vote against mother, apple pie, Girl Scouts and the president of the
Senate [who sponsored the legislation and jokingly offered Girl Scout cookies as an inducement].").
364. See Minnesota v. Clover LeafCreamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,461 (1981) (explaining that
rational basis review applies to Equal Protection Clause challenge to economic legislation).
365. Cf.Gibbons v. Ogden, 22U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,245 (1824) ('The wisdom and the discretion

of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which
the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.").
366. Cf.New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (stating that Congress must
encourage state action so that "state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's
preferences [and] state officials remain accountable to the people").

367. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 1357
(2000) ("The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same
respect as are majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon
majoritarian consent.").
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preferences" 3 8-- means that viewpoint considerations will almost certainly
enter into some decisionmaking.36 9 The fact that legislators are not
constrained by clear, objective standards and so can decide on the basis of
viewpoint infects the forum.- 0 The knowledge by potential applicants that
371
legislators sponsor and approve legislation undoubtedly chills applicants.
These facts make a legislative attempt to run a private speech forum
unconstitutional.
A comparison among several of the Confederate flag logo cases
illustrates the difference, with respect to judicial review, of executive, as
opposed to legislative, administration of a private speech forum. In Sons
of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, the court noted that the
Maryland Legislature, by statute, authorized the Motor Vehicle
Administration (MVA) to issue specialty license plates to "qualifying nonprofit organizations. 372 The legislature, by statute, also provided the
grounds by which an organization could "qualify" for the plates and by
which an individual motor vehicle owner could obtain them.373 Beyond
status and payment requirements, the legislature did not provide any
grounds for rejecting particular applications. At the time that it recalled the
SCV's Confederate flag logo plate, the MVA had not issued more specific
regulations with respect to specialty plates. Instead, it relied upon its
regulations governing the issuance of personalized or "vanity" license
plates. Specifically, it relied upon the regulation that allows the MVA to
refuse to issue or recall a plate if "it could be considered objectionable or

368. Id.
369. See SantaFe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266,2276 (2000) ("[S]tudent elections

that determine, by majority vote, which expressive activities shall receive or not receive school
benefits ...do 0 nothing to protect minority views but rather place[] the students who hold such
views at the mercy of the majority.').
370. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. S.W. Ohio Reg. Transit
Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 359 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that, in administering a private speech forum,

official's decision to limit access must be "constrained by objective criteria" and not rest on
"ambiguous and subjective reasons") (quoting Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Moreno

Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996)).
371. See Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at
*10 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22,1999) (noting, but rejecting as "legally speculative," "Plaintiffs' suggestion

that the current political climate does not augur well for the passage of a pro choice license plate
law"); Gyan, supra note 115, at lB (noting that Plaintiffs' attorney argued that "it would be 'futile'

to him to get Louisiana lawmakers to vote for [some sort of pro choice plate]").
372. 954F. Supp. 1099, 1100(D. Md. 1997).

373. Id. ("To qualify for organization plates, a motor vehicle owner must satisfactorily
demonstrate that he or she is a member of a nonprofit organization and is in compliance with MVA

regulations. In addition, at least twenty-five owners of vehicles in a particular class must apply for
the special registration plates, and at least twenty-five such plates must be issued initially. The
vehicle owner must also pay a fee of $15 for the special organization registration plates.") (citations
omitted).
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offensive as a term of bigotry, a term of hostility, an insulting or
derogatory term, or a racially degrading term."374 Because the MVA was
required to explain how its actions fit within its statutory mandate and to
point to reasons within its broad statutory mandate that channeled its
otherwise unconstitutionally broad discretion to choose among speakers,
the court could identify the reason for the government action and compare
it to the Constitution's free speech guarantee. In that case, the court held
that the MVA's reason for recalling the SCV plate was based on
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 3"
Similarly, North Carolina courts were able to review and invalidate the
state Division of Motor Vehicle's denial of specialty plates to the SCV.376
In this instance, the challenge did not involve the Constitution's free
speech guarantee, but rather statutory interpretation. 3 7 The DMV
Commissioner had denied the SCV's specialty plate application based on
her conclusion that the organization did not "meet the statutory criteria for
a civic club. '37 s The court interpreted the statute, determined its meaning
according to the usual tools that determine legislative intent, 379 and held
that the DMV had erred in denying the SCV specialty plate application.3 s°
By contrast, SCV challenges to legislative action denying its plate
applications must be more difficult because of the limits ofjudicial review.
First, statutory boundaries such as those imposed in the North Carolina
case will not apply in a meaningful way because courts will presume the
legislature to know its own intent where terms are ambiguous, and the
legislature has the power to change unambiguous terms to meet new
circumstances. Second, and more significantly, courts will have difficulty
enforcing constitutional guarantees of equal treatment where the different
treatment occurs not within a piece of legislation, but between different

374. Id.
375. Id. at 1104 ("The Defendants' actions throughout this whole controversy belie any notion
that they acted in a viewpoint-neutral manner.").
376. N.C. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Faulkner, 509 S.E.2d 207, 209 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998).

377. Id. at 209 n.1 ("SCV's emblem strikingly resembles the Confederate flag. We are aware
of the sensitivity of many of our citizens to the display of the Confederate flag. Whether the display
of the Confederate flag on state-issued license plates represents sound public policy is not an issue

presented to this Court in this case. That is an issue for our General Assembly. We are presented
only with the issue of whether SCV-NCD has complied with the language of [the statute], and note
that allowing some organizations which fall within [the statute's] criteria to obtain personalized
plates while disallowing others equally within the criteria could implicate the First Amendment's
restriction against content-based restraints on free speech.").
378. Id. at 209.
379. Id. at 210 ("It is a well-established tenet of statutory construction that the intent of the
General Assembly controls.").
380. Id. at 211 ("[A]s SCV-NCD meets the four criteria enumerated by our General Assembly
in [the statute], SCV-NCD qualifies for special registration plates.").
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ones. Where the different treatment is not apparent in one legislative
action, it is more difficult for a court to identify-and charge the
legislature with-unconstitutional discrimination. 8 So, for example, the
Florida court reviewing the legislature's approval of the "Choose Life"
plate found the authorizing legislation, alone, to prove nothing with respect
to the plaintiffs' free speech rights.3at While denial of an application more
directly limits free speech rights, the problem for a court is identifying the
reason for the denial as unconstitutional. While statutes usually contain a
statement of purpose that can guide a court's inquiry," 3 legislatures do not
publish reasons for failing to approve proposed legislation. Individual
legislators may state their reasons for failing to vote for a piece of
legislation, but courts are loathe to rely on these individual statements as
evidence of legislative intent.3 '
The two recent cases involving legislatures' denial of the Confederate
flag logo on specialty license plates illustrate these difficulties with
discerning legislative intent. In Virginia, the SCV's plate application, after
much lobbying and a number of public hearings, made it through the
legislative committee to the full legislature." That body approved the
plate without the flag logo. Before that body, the head of the legislature's
Black Caucus had spoken against the flag logo, arguing that it sent a
message of racial hatred. Media accounts linked the two events, giving the
"reason" for the logo denial as its racially offensive meaning."' But for a
court to make this linkage in a constitutional challenge is more
problematic, as the court must attribute one legislator's motive to others,
and then find that combined motive to be the legislature's purpose. The
Supreme Court has cautioned against making this linkage."' Although the

381. Cf. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,200 (1994) (stating that, while both
an "evenhanded tax" on milk producers and a subsidy from ageneral fund to in-state producers may
be presumed valid despite possible "adverse effects on interstate commerce," combination of the
two within one piece of legislation renders it invalid under the dormant commerce clause, which

prohibits discrimination by a state against out-of-state economic actors).
382. Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22503, at *12

(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22,1999).
383. A legislative statement of purpose, however, is not required. SeeNordlingerv. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 15 (1992) ("To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of
rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time

the purpose or rationale supporting its classifieation.').
384. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of

constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.").
385. See supraPart I.A.
386. Heyser & Knepler, supra note 175, at A16 (stating that the "spellbinding speech" was
what "compelled" a legislative compromise approving the SCV plate without the flag logo).
387. See O'Brien,391 U.S. at 384 ("What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently
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district court in Virginia found the "motivation" behind the legislature's
action to be unconstitutionally viewpoint-based, it relied on a finding that
the legislature "targeted" the Confederate flag logo for disapproval after
approving "hundreds" of others.388 This type of "stark" demonstration of
discriminatory purpose, 389 however, will rarely be present to the
extent
39 °
it.
upon
action
legislative
invalid
of
finding
a
hinge
to
required
The dispute in Tennessee further illustrates the difficulties with
discerning legislative intent. There, the SCV's plate application passed the
Senate, but did not make it to the floor of the legislature. Instead, the
House Calendar Committee "killed" it. Again, the media linked the
procedural move with objections by black lawmakers.39 ' For a court to find
the legislature to have acted unconstitutionally by making such a move,
which does not normally require explanation, would intrude upon the
constitutionally guaranteed discretion of the legislature to act, in its
processes, according to the interplay of political forces.
The Louisiana court came closest to the mark when it invalidated the
state legislature's approval of the "Choose Life" specialty plate on the
ground that free speech clause injury occurred because the state injected
itself into what was supposed to be a viewpoint neutral speech forum.3 2
According to that court, "Once a forum has been created which allows
viewpoint discrimination, it is unconstitutional from the moment the
discriminatory forum is created."3 93 That court hinged its decision,
however, on a finding that the state claimed the "Choose Life" message as
its own, a position not stated in the authorizing legislation and which a
number of legislators and the state's governor publicly disputed. If it is the

high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void [legislation] which could be reenacted in its
exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it.").
388. SCV v. Holcomb, No. 7:99CV00530, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 538, at*14 (W.D. Va. Jan.
18, 2001).
389. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
390. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) ("We do not assume

unconstitutional legislative intent even when statutes produce harmful results.") (citing Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976)); Hunt v. Cromartie, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3206, at *14 (Apr. 18,
2000) (burden in Plantiffs to show that race motivated the legislature in drawing voting districts is
a "demanding one") (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995) ("In the absence of apattem as stark as
those in Yick Wo [all Chinese applications denied] or Gomillion,impact alone is not determinative

and the court must look to other evidence of race-based decisionmaking,") (quoting Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266 (1977)); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at
341 (serpent-shaped voting district with dramatic racial impact provides "mathematical

demonstration" of discriminatory purpose); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,646-47 (1993) (objective
evidence
391.
392.
393.

may demonstrate discriminatory legislative purpose in "exceptional cases").
Humphrey, supra note 189, at A3.
Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 600 (E.D. La. 2000).
Id. at 601.
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government's purpose to own the message that is constitutionally
determinative, then the legislature could simply re-pass the authorizing
statute with a careful statement disassociating itself from the message. The
legislature's ability to do this, and thus immunize itself from meaningful
judicial review, illustrates the more fundamental constitutional problem
with the forum-that the legislature is administering it. It is the legislature's
"unbridled discretion" to enact or reject particular pieces of legislation that
is fundamentally inconsistent with what must be constitutionally channeled
discretion "to permit or deny expressive activity" within a private speech
forum.3 9
V. STRUCTURING A CONSTITUTIONAL SPECIALTY LICENSE
PLATE PROGRAM

Most current specialty license plate programs violate the Constitution
because the legislative approval process encourages viewpoint
discrimination in a private speech forum. Although the legislature must
lose some control over the content of specialty license plates in order to
make a program constitutional, the government more broadly need not
abdicate all authority over the appearance ofthe state's license plates when
it decides to ran a specialty plate program. By following a few guidelines,
a state can establish and administer a constitutional specialty license plate
program.
A. Remove Approval of IndividualApplicationsfrom the Legislature
Like choosing which individuals will be subject to particular rules and
prohibitions, choosing the speakers who may gain access to a private
speech forum is properly an executive function. This separation of powers
is necessary to ensure that a forum, which must be viewpoint neutral, is in
fact so in application. The legislature must constitutionally delegate
individual decisionmaking authority in a private speech forum to some
entity outside the legislature so that the forum access decisions can be
subject to meaningful judicial review. 95
Most important is that the legislature already have a specialty plate
approval process administered by a body outside the legislature, such as
the state's department of motor vehicles." Some states have recently

394. Id. (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,755-56 (1988)).
395. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,954 n.16 (1983) ("Executive action under legislatively
delegated authority... is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it;
and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to
modify or revoke the authority entirely.").
396. See, e.g., Sons of ConfederateVeterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954F. Supp. 1099,1100 (D.
Md. 1997) (noting that the Maryland decisionmaking authority is vested in the Motor Vehicle
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changed procedures3" or are considering doing so. 398 The decisionmaking
authority can approve individual specialty plate applications pursuant to
either generaff or more detailed statutory authorization. 4°° In either
situation, the decisionmaker will understand that both the authorizing
legislation and the constitutional equal access guarantees bound its
discretion, and that in response to a challenge it must provide reasons for
an access decision that demonstrate that it observed these boundaries.
B. Establish Clear,Non-Viewpoint Discriminatory
Access Standards
Access to a private speech forum must be reasonable and not viewpoint
discriminatory. Reasonableness refers to the compatibility of private
speech with the other uses of the forum. 4° Because of the limited space on
a license plate and its primary vehicle identifying function, many access
rules will be reasonable. Specifically, states could eliminate specialty
license plate programs entirely without constitutional impediment. The
primary question, then, is whether an access standard is viewpoint

discriminatory on its face, or accords the decisionmaker sufficient
discretion that the standard will permit viewpoint discrimination as
applied.
If an agency wants to retain the discretion to deny some specialty plate

applications, it must promulgate regulations that it can uniformly and
consistently apply to all specialty plate applications. Such standards,
articulated before an application denial, guard against claims of"unbridled
Administration); N.C. Div. ofSonsofConfederateVeteransv. Faulkner, 509 S.E.2d 207,210 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the North Carolina decisionmaking authority is vested in the Division

of Motor Vehicles).
397. SCVSouth Carolina,supranote 17, at B2 ("A South Carolina license plate bearing the
Confederate battle flag will be the first produced under anew procedure for issuing specialty plates,
the Department of Public Safety says.").
398. See S. 1329, supra note 46 (moving specialty plate authorization from the legislature to
the Department of Motor Vehicles).
399. See, e.g., Faulkner,509 S.E.2d at 210 (recognizing specialty plates "[i]ssuable to a
member of a nationally recognized [tax exempt] civic organization" that provides "at least 3000
applications for that civic club plate").
400. See S. 1329, supra note 46 (requiring that groups applying for specialty license plates

"not discriminate on the basis of race, nationality, religion, political party affiliation or sexual
orientation").
401. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998) ("To be
consistent with the First Amendment, the exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not
be based on the speaker s viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the
property.").
402. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683-85 (1992)
(finding a solicitation ban in airport reasonable because of "[t]he inconveniences to passengers and
the [congestion] burdens on [airport] officials").
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discretion" or "post-hoc policy formulation ' 4 that may "conceal a bias
against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded speakers.'"' 5 The
standards, of course, must be facially viewpoint neutral. Some access
standards obviously meet this requirement, such as those that require
nonprofit status, marketing plans or initial purchase commitments. Other
standards stated broadly in terms of "taste," "morality," "politics," or
"controversy" on their face permit too much discretion by the decision
maker to discriminate according to viewpoint.'
Less certain as to their constitutionality are standards between these two
extremes. States commonly want to grant license plate access to private
speakers, but limit "offensive" types of expression. In the context of vanity
plates, where individual drivers choose their unique letter/number
configurations, states commonly prohibit configurations that appear as
vulgar sexual references, profanity or hate speech.4 To the extent these
limitations are constitutional in the vanity plate context, they are
constitutional in the specialty plate context as well.' In particular, states
can prohibit certain words and references that offend public sensibilities,
so long as they do so clearly and consistently. 4m So, for example,
Maryland's denial of logo plates with a naked Buddha or the letters
'WU''4 1° could meet constitutional standards if Maryland had a clear and
consistent policy of prohibiting sex depictions or references on license
plates.
But, while the vanity plate access standards may apply to specialty
plates as well, once the access administration is moved to an administrative

403. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,755 (1988).
404. Air line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1153 (7th Cir.
1995) ("The government may not 'create' a policy to implement its newly-discovered desire to
suppress a particular message.").
405. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,812 (1985).
406. See, e.g., Air Line PilotsAssn., 45 F.3d at 1154 n.5 (holding that factors of "taste,"
"morality," and"political"factors are "standards too vague to be enforced"); see also Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, The PublicSensibilitiesForum, NORTHWESERN L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (setting out
constitutionally permissible access standards for nonpublic forums, including "vanity" license plate
programs).
407. See, e.g., McMahon v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 522 N.W.2d 51,55 (Iowa 1994) (holding
that state can choose to reject letter combinations that are "sexual in connotation or otherwise
offensive"); 761 IOWA ADMIN. CODE 401.6(321)(d) (2001) ("No combination of characters shall
be issued which is sexual in connotation; defined in dictionaries as a term of vulgarity, contempt,
prejudice, hostility, insult, or racial or ethnic degradation; recognized as a swear word; considered
to be offensive; or a foreign word falling into any of these categories.').
408. See Jacobs, supra note 406 (setting out boundaries of a legitimate "public sensibilities
forum," arguing that state vanity license plate programs can fall within it, and articulating
permissible public sensibilities standards that limit the risk of invidious viewpoint discrimination).
409. See id.
410. MVA to Revoke, supra note 130, at IA.
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agency that is subject to judicial review, a fundamental difference between
the nature of the license plate access makes those standards probably less
applicable in the specialty plate context. The difference between the two
types of plates is that, while vanity plate messages are often apparently
trivial or indecipherable, 4" specialty plates, by their nature, send a message
of affiliation with a group or cause. Usually, these messages do not contain
specific words that can be identified as offensively sex-related, vulgar or
hateful. Instead, public offense comes from dislike or disagreement with
the group or cause. This type of viewpoint-related public "offense" cannot
412
justify the government's denying access to a private speech forum.
Consequently, the constitutional applications of the vanity plate
standards to specialty plate applications will be few, while the temptation
to use the standards to suppress disliked viewpoints will be great. A
comparison of vanity and specialty plate messages illustrates their
difference. As to vanity plates, it should be constitutional for a state agency
to deny an application for a "MOMN8ER" configuration,413 so long as the
policy prohibits hate configurations in general, or specific advocacy of
hate, violence or inferiority directed at any type of group of persons. 414 This
is different, however, from a state agency prohibiting the SCV from
displaying the Confederate flag as part of its trademarked logo. The
message of the logo is one of affiliation with a group, not a directed
expression of hatred." 5 Absent the use of specifically defined words or
images that offend public sensibilities in ways that can be stated generally,
so as not to aim at particular viewpoints, the exclusion is unconstitutional.
C. Administer the ProgramConsistently
A decisionmaker must administer a specialty license plate program
consistently. As the Court has emphasized, both "the policy and the
practice of the government" are relevant to determine the extent to which

411. Elaine Viets, Vanity, Thy Name Is License Plate, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, INC., May
5, 1992, at 3D (listing examples of "incomprehensible vanity license plates").
412. Jacobs, supranote 406 (arguing that while specific public sensibilities standards that have
a primary application to the mode of expression can be constitutional in the license plates context,
general standards that prohibit "offensive" expressions are unconstitutionally vague, leaving

administrators too much discretion to discriminate according to viewpoint).
413. Judy Fahys, State's Tag Team Tries to Keep it Tasteful; DMV Tries to Keep Tags
Tasteful, THE SALT LAKE TRIBuNE, Oct. 17, 1991, at Al (vanity license plate configuration

interpreted to mean "mormon hater" rejected by Utah DMV).
414. See Jacobs, supranote 406 (arguing that such standards should be constitutional in the
context of vanity license plates).
415. See Dimmick v. Quigley, No. C96-3987S1 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 1998) (order granting in

part and denying in part defendant's motion for summary judgement), at 9 (distinguishing "HIV
POS" vanity plate from those with "inherently offensive" racial slurs).
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the government has opened a private speech forum. 1 Lower courts
reviewing government agencies' administration of private speech forums
have underscored that the access rules that the government can
constitutionally enforce are those evidenced by its "consistent policy and
practice."4 7 So, for example, while an administrator may have the
authority to deny access to some "sexually explicit speech and/or patently
offensive" speech, it cannot allow access to some speech within that
category but deny access to other speech "at least as sexually explicit
and/or patently offensive."41' What is required is the application of "neutral
standards... quite precisely."' 19
In addition to clear, narrow standards, then, evidence of consistent
enforcement will help demonstrate the constitutionality of a specialty plate
program. Although record- keeping is not constitutionally required, it can
help ensure and demonstrate consistency. With respect to any application
denial, a decisionmaker should explain its decisions according to
established access guidelines, and should maintain records of previous
decisions as precedents to ensure uniform application of the standards.
VI. CONCLUSION

The current legislatively-run specialty plate programs mix two
constitutionally inconsistent commands. The first is for legislators to enact
laws that reflect the majority interests and values. The second is for them
to administer a private speech forum in a way that does not discriminate
according to viewpoint. The conflicting mandates render it almost certain
that the administration of a private speech forum by the legislature will
result in viewpoint discrimination. The legislature's broad discretion to
enact or fail to enact laws based upon its perception of the public interest
make it almost impossible for courts to determine if the constitutionally
prohibited viewpoint discrimination has occurred.
These observations lead to the conclusion that a legislature cannot
constitutionally run a private speech forum. Of course states can choose to
make specialty license plates available to their citizens. To do so, however,
they must remove administration of the program from the legislature. With
clear, non-viewpoint discriminatory standards, administered consistently
by an entity subject to meaningful judicial review, a specialty license plate
program can meet the Constitution's free speech guarantee.

416. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
417. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Dep't ofAviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144,1152 (7th Cir.
1995).
418. AIDS Action Comm of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.

1994).
419. Id. at 13.
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